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The thesis consists of three self-contained articles that empirically investigate socio-
economic differences in, and interrelationships amongst, science knowledge, biomedical 
self-efficacy, and participation in medical decision-making.  
Chapter 2 investigates age-related bias in the science knowledge questions in the Wellcome 
Trust Monitor Survey Waves I and II. It also examines what evidence there is for three 
dimensions of knowledge. Chapter 3 studies the influence of Internet use and paying 
attention to medical stories online in reducing science knowledge and biomedical self-
efficacy gaps between low and high educational groups. Wave II of the Wellcome Trust 
Monitor Surveys is employed in this chapter. Chapter 4 scrutinises the influence of various 
socio-economic factors, biomedical self-efficacy, and trust in physicians and other medical 
practitioners on public willingness and confidence to take part in the medical decision-
making process. Chapter 4 uses Wave III of the Wellcome Trust Monitor Survey.  
Chapter 2 finds evidence for age-related bias in the science knowledge battery of questions; 
no evidence of a misinformed group of respondents was found; a group who consistently 
said they didn’t know instead of providing an answer that was wrong was found; a 
sensitivity analysis showed that using the summed score approach leads to the same 
substantive conclusions as a model taking into account age-related non-invariance. Chapter 3 
finds evidence of education-based knowledge and efficacy gaps. It also finds some evidence 
that the Internet can help reduce that democratic deficit in information. Chapter 4 finds 
evidence that people are generally confident to participate. Those who are more self-
efficacious are also more confident to participate in medical decisions. The opposite held 


























Table of Contents 
1. Overall Introduction ..................................................................................................... 1 
1.1 Thesis background ............................................................................................................. 1 
1.2 Breakdown of chapters ...................................................................................................... 4 
1.2.1 Publication plan: ................................................................................................................... 7 
1.3 Collaboration with the Wellcome Trust .............................................................................. 7 
2. Information, Misinformation, Lack of Information, and Age-based Differences in 
Science Knowledge: A Multi-group Latent Class Model. ............................................. 10 
2.1. Introduction ................................................................................................................... 10 
2.1.1. Information, Lack of information, Misinformation ........................................................... 10 
2.1.2. Science Knowledge ........................................................................................................... 12 
2.1.3. Age, Knowledge, and Don’t Know Answers .................................................................... 13 
2.2. Methodology .................................................................................................................. 15 
2.2.1. The Wellcome Trust Monitor Surveys .............................................................................. 15 
2.2.2. Measures ........................................................................................................................... 16 
2.2.3. Research Questions ........................................................................................................... 20 
2.2.4. Analytical Approach ......................................................................................................... 20 
2.2.4.1. Multi-group Latent Class Analysis (LCA) ................................................................................ 21 
2.2.4.2. Model Fit ................................................................................................................................... 23 
2.3. Results ........................................................................................................................... 24 
2.4. Sensitivity Analysis ......................................................................................................... 34 
2.4.1 An attitudinal measure and science knowledge ................................................................. 34 
2.4.2 Covariates ........................................................................................................................... 35 
2.4.3 Analytical Approach .......................................................................................................... 36 
2.4.4 Results ................................................................................................................................ 36 
2.5. Conclusion...................................................................................................................... 38 
References ............................................................................................................................ 43 
3. Educational Disparities, Biomedical Efficacy and Science Knowledge Gaps: can the 
Internet help us reduce these inequalities? ................................................................... 47 
3.1. Introduction ................................................................................................................... 47 
3.1.1. Biomedical Self-Efficacy .................................................................................................. 50 
3.1.2. The Internet, Biomedical Self-Efficacy, and Science Knowledge .................................... 53 
3.1.3. Testing the Knowledge Gap Hypothesis ........................................................................... 57 
3.2. Method .......................................................................................................................... 58 
3.3 Results ............................................................................................................................ 67 
3.4. Conclusion...................................................................................................................... 74 
3.5. Appendix ........................................................................................................................ 77 
References ............................................................................................................................ 84 
4. “Excuse me, doctor…” What drives people’s confidence to participate in medical 
decision-making? .......................................................................................................... 90 
4.1. Introduction ................................................................................................................... 90 
4.1.1. The doctor-patient relationship ......................................................................................... 90 
4.1.3. Preferences for participation and socio-economic differences .......................................... 94 
4.1.4. Efficacy, Trust, and Participation in medical decision-making ........................................ 96 




4.2.1. Data ................................................................................................................................. 101 
4.2.2. Measures ......................................................................................................................... 101 
4.2.3. Analytical Strategy .......................................................................................................... 106 
4.3. Results ......................................................................................................................... 107 
4.4. Conclusion.................................................................................................................... 114 
4.5 Appendix ....................................................................................................................... 117 
References .......................................................................................................................... 130 
5. Overall Conclusion ................................................................................................... 136 












1. Overall Introduction 
 
1.1 Thesis background 
 
The world is facing growing inequalities between groups with low and high socio-economic 
power. This poses great challenges to democracies and paves the way for even wider gaps 
between the rich and the poor in the future. If left unaddressed, the cycle will continue to 
perpetuate itself indefinitely because poverty breeds even more poverty. Information and 
access to information disparities have been identified as primordial in addressing this threat 
to the legitimacy of the democratic process by the World Economic Forum (Bilbao-Osorio et 
al., 2011).  
Science and medicine, democratic institutions in their own right, constitute a central part in 
achieving progress. They are also two of the conveyors of inequality, in part due to their very 
specialised nature, and in part due to them being very hierarchical and traditionally 
paternalistic institutions. Differences in levels of scientific literacy between low and high 
socio-economic groups are well documented in the literature (Miller, 2001; Tichenor et al., 
1970). The same holds true for public participation in the medical decision-making process 
(DeWalt, 2007). Addressing how we measure central constructs, such as scientific literacy 
and socio-economic disparities, as well as the factors that contribute to the creation and 
propagation of these inequalities is of vital importance in addressing the democratic deficit 
in information. Moreover, understanding the factors at play in giving citizens agency to take 
part in the decision-making process regarding their health is imperative in an effort to 
transition to a more democratic form of medical practice, and move from the paternalistic 
model of medicine towards a shared-decision model (Charles, Gafni, Whelan, 1999). 
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Consequently, my PhD thesis is composed of three separate papers that centre on two main 
themes related to the above. The first theme addresses a methodological issue, namely the 
measurement of science knowledge and the extent of age-related bias. The second theme 
tackles the complexities of the interrelationships among socio-economic factors, science 
knowledge, biomedical self-efficacy, and trust in doctors. Chapter 2 investigates the extent 
of age-related bias in how we have traditionally measured science knowledge. Mass media 
effects on knowledge and efficacy gaps caused by educational differences are explored in 
Chapter 3. The role of efficacy and trust, along with socio-economic factors, in shaping 
public attitudes toward participation in medical decision-making is explored in Chapter 4. I 
use the Wellcome Trust Monitor Surveys (Waves I, II, and III) in all the work presented in 
this thesis. 








Trust in doctors 
 






The conceptual model presented in the diagram only serves as an illustration of the types of 
relationships explored in this thesis. However, two of the central concepts represented, 
biomedical self-efficacy and one socio-economic factor, namely age, are measured 
differently in some of the empirical chapters. The variation in measurement needs to be 
explained before going into detail regarding the analyses conducted in each of the chapters. 
Firstly, biomedical self-efficacy is measured differently in Chapters 3 and 4. The sole reason 
for this analytical decision was a lack of data availability. In Chapter 3 I use Wave II of the 
Wellcome Trust Survey, whereas in Chapter 4 I use Wave III of the same survey. This 
decision was made because the outcome investigated in Chapter 4, namely participation in 
medical decision-making, was not available at Wave II.  
Furthermore, the efficacy measure used in Chapter 3 is composed of two elements: 1. self-
reported familiarity with biomedical terms; 2. participation in debates regarding regulating 
medical research; The efficacy measure in Chapter 4 is also composed of element 1, but 
element 2 is concerned with a different form of participation, namely discussions of science 
stories heard on the news. The first measure of efficacy relates to biomedicine as a more 
external entity. The second measure can be argued to personalise it to an extent, seeing as the 
participatory component is about everyday discussions of science, not public debates. There 
is one main implication for the conceptual model. Any positive association between Internet 
use and efficacy in Chapter 3 cannot be extended when discussing the impact of increased 
self-efficacy on participation in medical-decision making. In other words, if efficacy is found 
to have a positive impact on participation in medical decision-making, it would not be 
conceptually and empirically rigorous to say that the Internet is a medium through which that 




Lastly, age is recoded into different categories in each chapter. The rationale for this 
analytical decision is twofold. Firstly, it serves a different function in Chapter 2, compared to 
Chapters 3 and 4. Namely, the analysis in Chapter 2 focusses on potential age-related bias in 
the knowledge battery at Waves I and II of the Wellcome Trust Survey. Due to data 
constraint and computationally demanding models, which require reasonable sample sizes, 
age was split into three categories: ‘14-18’, ‘19-49’, ‘50 and over’. In Chapter 3, age is 
measured as a continuous variable, it is not a central measure, and it is included in analyses 
because it is a potential confounder. In Chapter 4, age is just one of the socio-economic 
factors explored in relation to the outcome. It was recoded into three categories: 18-34, 35-
54, 55 and over. The main implication for the conceptual model is that any relationships 
between age and knowledge, age and efficacy, and age and participation in medical decision-
making, will carry different meanings. For instance, if age is found to be a driver of 
participation in medical decision-making in Chapter 4, and age is also found to have a 
positive relationship with efficacy in Chapter 3, any policy implications for increasing 
population-level confidence and participation derived from the thesis as a whole should bear 
in mind the different sub-populations used in each analysis.  
 
1.2 Breakdown of chapters 
 
One of the socio-economic factors found to have an association with science knowledge is 
age. Older people have usually been found to know less about science than young people. 
This has been found using the summed score approach whereby incorrect answers and don’t 
knows are coupled together as wrong answers, and correct and wrong responses are added 
up into a scale representing an incremental measure of knowledge. Moreover, there is 
evidence that information, lack of information, and misinformation would have a different 
impact on attitudes, compared to the two-dimensional operationalisation of the construct 
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(information versus lack of information) that has been the focus of most Public 
Understanding of Science studies (henceforth ‘PUS’) (Luskin and Bullock, 2011).  
In Chapter 2 I explore the methodological question of whether older respondents really 
know less about science, or whether the questions used in the Wellcome Trust Monitor 
Surveys I and II to measure it behave differently in different age groups (14-18, 19-49, 50+). 
Multi-group Latent Class Models are employed to this end. In other words, the general 
question I pose is: Are older respondents really less science literate or do these questions 
trigger different probabilities of a correct response for people in different age brackets? In 
addition, I also test to see if there is evidence of misinformation. No evidence of 
misinformation is found. Evidence is found that the science knowledge questions work 
differently across the age groups. To put it simply, older people don’t really know less about 
science (from what we can know so far), instead the questions we are using to test science 
literacy appear to favour younger people. A sensitivity analysis is therefore conducted in 
order to ascertain whether using the latent class framework accounting for age-related bias 
instead of the summed scale would make a practical difference when analysing a substantive 
matter, namely attitudes to genetics. No substantive differences are found.  
In Chapter 3, Professor Allum and I test for science knowledge and internal biomedical 
self-efficacy gaps between groups of people with low and high educational backgrounds, 
using Wave II of the Wellcome Trust Monitor Surveys. We also test whether Internet use 
and paying attention to medical stories online help reduce educational disparities in 
knowledge and efficacy. Biomedical self-efficacy is a concept that is new to Public 
Understanding of Science (henceforth mostly referred to as biomedical self-efficacy or, 
simply, efficacy). This is mostly based on the concept of internal political efficacy (Tedesco, 
2011). It taps into self-reported knowledge of biomedical terms and willingness to 
participate in the debates regarding regulating medical research. Since using a latent variable 
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framework accounting for age-related bias made no substantive difference to the attitudinal 
question investigated, and age differences are not the focus of this chapter, a summed 
science knowledge measure is employed. We model two sets of ordinary least squares 
regressions with three-way interactions amongst education level, internet use, and attention 
to medical stories online predicting, in turn, science knowledge and biomedical self-efficacy. 
Evidence of knowledge and efficacy gaps between low and high education groups is found. 
Using the Internet and paying attention to stories online are found to help reduce those 
differences, and thus potentially reduce the democratic deficit in information.  
 
In Chapter 4 I examine how two seemingly opposed factors, namely biomedical self-
efficacy and deference to medical authority (in the form of trust in doctors as information 
sources) shape the public’s confidence to challenge and query their General Practitioner’s 
(GP) decisions regarding their health, using Wave III of the Wellcome Monitor Surveys. 
Very few studies employing representative samples have been carried out studying this 
issue, and those few were set in the US. Biomedical self-efficacy is measured slightly 
differently in this chapter because of the unavailability of a question on participation in the 
debates about regulating medical research used to construct the efficacy measure used in 
Chapter 3. Instead, questions around people’s confidence to discuss science stories heard or 
seen on the news are used to tap into a more participatory aspect, as opposed to looking at 
just self-reported familiarity with biomedical terms, a common concept employed in PUS 
studies. Age, education, ethnicity, and gender are the socio-economic factors which are 
explored here. Moreover, knowing a medical professional and having a long-term illness or 
disability are also investigated. A conditional inference tree estimating an ordinal regression 
predicting willingness and confidence to query GPs is modelled. Biomedical efficacy and 
deference to medical authority are both included in the same model and the algorithm is 
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allowed to find the combinations of the two constructs that best predict confidence to 
participate. People who are efficacious are found to be more willing and confident to 
participate in decisions regarding their health, and thus subscribe to the shared model of 
patient-physician interaction, while those who show high deference to medical authority 
seem to adhere to the traditional paternalistic model of medicine.  
1.2.1 Publication plan: 
 
 Chapter 2 is currently under review for publication in the International Journal of 
Social Research Methodology. 
 Chapter 3 is co-authored with Professor Nick Allum and will soon be submitted to 
Science Communication. 
 Chapter 4 has been submitted to Social Science and Medicine. 
 
1.3 Collaboration with the Wellcome Trust 
 
 
My PhD was funded through a 1+3 scholarship awarded by the Economic and Social 
Research Council in collaboration with the Wellcome Trust, set up by Professor Nick Allum 
and Dr Hilary Leevers. My collaboration with the Wellcome Trust extended beyond that, 
however, and I will always be grateful for that opportunity. Firstly, for the first three years of 
my scholarship and first two years of my PhD, Dr Hilary Leevers, Head of Education & 
Learning at Wellcome, was my formal secondary supervisor. Her guidance has been 
invaluable and is greatly appreciated. Secondly, every year I spent two or three weeks at the 
Wellcome Trust main offices in London. I have been fortunate enough to be a part of three 
teams: the Education & Learning Team, the Evaluation Team, as well as the Insight & 
Anlysis Team. I have been responsible for checking all the analyses done for the report 
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accompanying the release of Wave II; I have advised on matters related to the design of both 
Wave II and III; I have conducted preliminary research on gender differences in attitudes to 
science as well as science capital in adults. This was then shared with a group at King’s 
College who were working on measures of science capital in young people. I have given 
quite a few internal talks there, and each talk has provided much food for thought and 
consisted of interesting debates. The diverse nature of the teams I have been a part of has 
provided a great opportunity for me to discuss my research with people who have very 
different backgrounds to mine: specialists in the natural sciences, neuroscientists, chemists, 
developmental psychologists, policy experts, to name just a few. This has provided a rich 
experience, beyond what one can get in a single academic department and, I believe it has 
made me a better researcher by giving me a broader perspective on the issues I investigate in 
this thesis.  
References cited in the ‘Overall Introduction’ are all to be found in the three ‘References’ 






















2. Information, Misinformation, Lack of Information, and 
Age-based Differences in Science Knowledge: A Multi-
group Latent Class Model. 
 
 2.1. Introduction 
2.1.1. Information, Lack of information, Misinformation 
The role of information in shaping public attitudes to a wide range of socio-political issues, 
as well as social behaviour, is well documented in the public opinion literature. The 
importance of citizens being factually informed has been the unwavering normative thrust in 
public opinion research since the publication of Converse’s classic study in 1964. The study 
of how people’s misperceptions affect their attitudes has lain primarily within the realms of 
experimental psychology and political science. The latter has perhaps been more filled with 
applications of experimental research into its main areas of interest, such as attitudes to 
political issues, political candidates or incumbents, as well as voting behaviour 
(Lewandowsky, Ecker, Seifert, Schwarz, and Cook, 2012). 
Scholars have focused on the role of ignorance and the various ways it influences public 
opinion. In other words, they have focused on distinguishing citizens who are informed from 
those who are uninformed, and the consequences this might have on their views and 
behaviour. However, a significant advance was made by Kuklinski, Quirk, Jerit, Schwieder, 
and Rich (2001), who posited that there are fundamental notional differences between 
simply being uninformed about a fact and being confidently wrong about it, or being 
misinformed (See also Luskin and Bullock, 2011). They put forward a conceptualisation of 
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three terms: information (correct answers), lack of information (saying ‘don’t know’), and 
misinformation (thinking you know something and getting it wrong). Moreover, since 
knowledge is advocated as one of the pillars of a democracy, scholars have argued that there 
is a societal cost of misinformation. Thus, if a majority accepts as true a fact that is incorrect, 
this misperception may form the basis for political and societal decisions that offset the best 
interest of a democracy. In a similar vein, it is argued that if individuals are simply wrong-
headed about something, they may make choices, for themselves and their families, that are 
not in the least beneficial and can come at a great cost (Kuklinski et al., 2001). 
Kuklinski et al. (2001) postulate that dependence on misinformation is different from mere 
ignorance, defined as the absence of knowledge. Ignorance may be less pernicious than 
misinformation because, in the absence of knowledge, people often turn to simpler heuristics 
when making decisions. These can work well, at least under the right circumstances. For 
example, simple awareness of an object often allows citizens to make acceptable deductions 
about it. Also, on average, people tend to not rely a great deal on decisions made solely on 
the basis of such heuristics (Dancey and Sheagley, 2013). Lack of knowledge about a fact or 
a set of facts hardly ever drives support for a cause, in contrast to false beliefs based on 
misinformation, which are often held strongly and with conviction. For instance, studies 
have shown that those who most heartily snub the scientific evidence for climate change are 
also those who believe they are best informed about the subject (Lewandowsky et al., 2012). 
Thus, the measures developed here, aiming to distinguish between these three types of 
respondents, could potentially help us to better comprehend the mechanisms underpinning 






 2.1.2. Science Knowledge 
Capturing the construct of science knowledge has been a central concern in PUS research 
from the very beginning. Social surveys have been an essential tool for researching science 
knowledge and attitudes towards science and technology. The first survey used in PUS was 
Withey’s in 1957, in the United States (Stares, 2008; Sturgis and Allum, 2004). Another 
important study was the US National Science Board’s biennial Science Indicators Survey in 
1979. The first survey of attitudes towards science conducted in the UK was Durant et al. in 
the late 1980s (Durant, Evans, and Thomas, 1989), and there are quite a few still ongoing. 
There appear to be two surveys that are either completely dedicated to topics pertaining to 
PUS, or just contain one or several PUS topic(s): the British Social Attitudes series, 
sponsored by the Wellcome Trust, government bodies and government-commissioned 
bodies (Stares, 2008), and the Wellcome Trust Monitor Surveys, with two waves completed. 
The latter is used in the present study. These surveys include items/questions designed to tap 
into people’s information levels, lack thereof, and, potentially, misinformation.  
Science knowledge is posited as a multidimensional concept. In the US, Jon D. Miller (1983, 
1992, 1998, 2004) argued that it has three linked dimensions, namely ‘a vocabulary of basic 
scientific constructs sufficient to read competing views in a newspaper or magazine […], an 
understanding of the process or nature of the scientific inquiry […], some level of 
understanding of the impact of science and technology on individuals and on society.’ UK 
scholars have put forward a fourth dimension, though, postulating that leaving science actors 
out of the discussion would lead to an insufficient comprehension of the scientific process 
(Bauer, Durant, Evans, 1994; Bauer, Petkova, Boyadjieva, 2000). 
The measures of science knowledge analysed here have a focus on biomedicine, particularly 
genetics. The most employed method of constructing the continuous measure of science 
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knowledge is the sum-score method mentioned above (adding up all the correct responses). 
The concern arising from utilising this method is at least threefold. Simply creating a score 
from all the correct answers omits taking into account measurement error. Second, all items 
are assumed to be of the same difficulty. Third, ‘don’t know’ answers are coupled with 
outright incorrect answers, where there is an apparent substantive difference between people 
admitting they do not have the information and those who answer incorrectly. This could be 
either because they think they know but they don’t, or due to a social desirability bias. 
 2.1.3. Age, Knowledge, and Don’t Know Answers 
The Wellcome Trust Monitor Survey is fielded to two samples, one of adults (aged 18+), and 
one of young people (aged 14-18). The survey contains multiple items designed to assess 
science knowledge and engagement with biomedical science. Analysis of the first Monitor 
Survey yielded a curvilinear relationship between age and high and low levels of scientific 
knowledge. High scorers were lowest among those aged 65 years and over. The proportion 
of high scorers for the middle age groups was around three in ten (of those aged 35-49 and 
50-64). For low scorers, the reverse pattern holds true, and for young people, 14-16 year olds 
were less likely to be high scorers than 17-18 year olds. However, these observations cannot 
be taken unproblematically to indicate true differences in knowledge about science between 
these age groups. Another possibility is that a given knowledge item has a different 
probability of generating a correct response from different age groups even if each age group 
has the same underlying level of knowledge. The cut-off point for the older age group 
examined in this study is 50 because it still makes substantive sense and it provides an 
adequate sample size for the multi-group analyses (Butt, Abeywardana, and Phillips, 2009). 
Converse (1964) stated that if a respondent is presented with an attitude/opinion item 
regarding an unfamiliar issue, they are very likely to say they don’t know.  Sicinsky (1970) 
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argues that this holds true for knowledge batteries as well as opinion batteries. There have 
been some debates in political science around the issue of what ‘don’t know’ answers 
represent, i.e. hidden knowledge, propensity to guess, etc. Luskin and Bullock (2011) show 
that, in the case of political knowledge at least, these ‘don’t know’ answers are not covering 
hidden knowledge. People who say they don’t know really don’t know.  Political studies 
have also shown older respondents have a higher chance of saying they don’t know than 
younger individuals. They also found that, in regression analyses, when controlling for 
education, gender, and race, that relationship tends to disappear (Ferber, 1966; Gergen and 
Back, 1965; Glenn, 1966; Francis and Busch, 1975). Be that as it may, when comparing age 
groups or merely individuals of different ages in terms of their knowledge levels, one can 
draw erroneous conclusions about an older respondent’s level of 
knowledge/ignorance/misinformation when not taking into account any potential 
measurement effects (here understood as possible non-equivalence of items across three age 
groups).  In other words, these observations about the relationship between ‘don’t know’ 
answers and age cannot be accepted for what they are without investigating whether they are 
indeed true or an artefact of measurement. 
This study has two primary goals: 1) to unearth information, lack of information, and 
misinformation measures from the data; 2) examine the extent to which the ten science 
knowledge questions work the same across the three age groups using a multi-group latent 
class model (Lazarsfeld and Henry, 1968; Clogg and Goodman, 1984). The latter is formally 
called measurement invariance or homogeneity, a term more specific to latent class 
terminology. Measurement invariance across groups/populations is presumed to characterise 
a scale/test/quiz when respondents with the same score on the underlying (latent) concept 
have the same expected raw/true score at the item level, the subscale total score level, or 
both. Essentially, the question is whether the test performs the same for each group of 
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respondents. Lack of measurement equivalence would render significant comparisons of 
observed mean score differences problematic. If the condition of measurement invariance 
does not hold, the aforementioned differences could indicate both the true difference 
between groups and a disparity between the underlying construct and the measured score 
that varies across groups. If, however, the condition of measurement invariance does hold, 
the relationship between the latent variable and each manifest variable remains invariant 
across groups. Thus, any observed difference can be taken as being indicative of only true 
differences between groups (Byrne, Shavelson, and Muthén, 1989; Byrne and Watkins, 
2003; Drasgow, Levine, and Williams, 1985).  
 2.2. Methodology 
2.2.1. The Wellcome Trust Monitor Surveys 
The data used in this study come from the Wellcome Monitor Survey Waves I and II. The 
Wellcome Monitor is a triennial survey of adults and young people in the UK, based on a 
representative probability sample. Its main purpose is to provide a more accurate and 
nuanced picture of interest in, knowledge of, and attitudes to medical research, with a focus 
on biomedicine. Wellcome Monitor I took place in 2009 and interviews were conducted with 
1179 adults (aged 18+) and 374 young people (14-18 years old; 121 part of a ‘core’ sample, 
and 253 part of a ‘boost’ sample). The response rate was 49.3% for the adult sample, 86.4% 
for the young ‘core’ sample, and 64.2% for the ‘boost’ sample (Butt et al., 2009). A 
complete report of the sampling procedure as well as other aspects of the survey design can 
be found in Butt et al. (2009).  Wellcome Monitor II took place in 2012 and interviews were 
conducted with 1,396 adults (aged 18+) and 460 young people (14-18 years old; 154 part of 
a ‘core’ sample, and 306 part of the ‘boost’ sample). The response rates for Monitor II were 
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52.6% for the adult sample, 75.4 % for the young ‘core’ sample, and 64.4% for the ‘boost 
sample’ (Clemence et al., 2013). 
All data preparation and analyses were carried out in Stata 12, SPSS 19, MPlus 7.31 
(Muthén & Muthén, 1998-2010), and R 3.2.0/RStudio 0.99.893. More specifically, the two 
cross-sectional data sets for Waves I and II of the Wellcome Monitor Survey (2009 and 
2012, respectively) were combined using the append command in Stata 12. The final sample 
size is fairly large, with a total of 3,409 respondents. Furthermore, all the recode procedures 
were carried out in SPSS, the latent class models were specified in MPlus 7.13, and the 
results were then exported to R for post-processing purposes. This was motivated by the fact 
that for latent class models with nominal indicators MPlus only gives results on a logit scale. 
These were then converted to probabilities in R. An additional model fit test, the likelihood 
ratio test, is also performed in R as it is beyond MPlus’s capabilities (Kuha, 2013). 
2.2.2. Measures 
 The Science Knowledge Items 
Ten items measuring knowledge of science (with a focus on genetics) have been asked of 
respondents from both Wave I and II. Moreover, nine of the ten items analysed here are 
‘textbook’, factual, quiz questions, and a tenth is designed to gauge the respondents’ 
understanding (or lack thereof) of controlled experiments. Nine statements were shown to 
the respondents and they were asked to choose one of five response options. The correct 
answer is given in brackets. 
1) Electrons are smaller than atoms. (T) 
2) All radioactivity is man-made. (F) 
3) All plants and animals have DNA. (T) 
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4) More than half of human genes are identical to those of mice. (T) 
5) The cloning of living things produces identical copies. (T) 
6) The oxygen we breathe comes from plants. (T) 
7) Lasers work by focusing sound waves. (F) 
8) By eating a genetically-modified fruit, a person’s genes could also become modified. (F) 
9) It is the mother’s genes that determine the sex of the child. (F) 
 
Respondents were presented with these nine statements and were then asked to choose one 
of the following response options: 
1) Definitely true 
2) Probably true 
3) Probably false 
4) Definitely false 
5) Don’t know 
 
Item 10 measures the respondents’ understanding of controlled experiments. The item is 
worded as follows: ‘Suppose a drug used to treat high blood pressure is suspected of having 
no effect. On this card, there are 3 different ways scientists might use to investigate the 
problem. Which one do you think scientists would be likely to use?’ Respondents are then 
asked to select one of the following options: 
1) Talk to those patients that have used the drug to get their opinion?  
2) Use their knowledge of medicine to decide how good the drug is?  
3) Give the drug to some patients, but not to others, then compare the results for each group?  
4) Don’t know. 
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The ten knowledge items were recoded so that each new item had three nominal categories 
denoting correct, incorrect, and ‘don’t know’ responses, each meant to represent 
information, misinformation, and lack of information, respectively. I regard all incorrect 
answers as indicating a degree of misinformation, whether respondents say ‘probably’ or 
‘definitely’ when answering wrongly. ‘Probably’ indicates some degree of confidence, and 
even though wrong beliefs held in this manner are probably less pernicious than those held 
with ultimate confidence, I posit that it would still make it very likely for someone to act on 
their wrongly held beliefs about an issue, as opposed to people who just admit they ‘don’t 
know’. On a different note, however, those saying ‘probably’ are most likely less resistant to 
change than individuals who exhibit more confidence in their answer. However, this 
particular nuanced distinction is for another study to determine. Table 2.0 presents 
frequencies for the three-category nominal science knowledge items. 
Table 2.0 Frequencies for knowledge items (%) 
 
Age  
 Age is measured as a continuous variable. For the purpose of the multiple group analysis, it 
was recoded as a categorical variable, yielding three age groups: 14-18 (863 respondents/ 
25.3%), 19-49 (1,233 respondents/36.2%), and over 50 (1,310 individuals/38.5%). The cut-
off points for the categories were informed by the data and model type. Multi-group latent 









Radioactivity 65.2 19.8 15.0 
DNA 88.5 5.1 6.4 
Mice 47.7 23.1 29.2 
Cloning 74.5 11.6 13.8 
Plants 82.6 11.8 5.7 
Lasers 44.0 24.5 31.6 
Genetically Modified 69.4 11.2 19.4 
Mother’s genes 63.5 19.0 17.5 




class models are sensitive to sample sizes within each group. This breakdown provided a 
large enough sample within group for me to be able to proceed with multi-group modelling 
and test for measurement invariance. As a result, the groups were formed as such so that they 
would make some substantive sense, as well as provide reasonable sample sizes for the 
models to converge successfully. Future analyses employing larger samples should 
endeavour to split the middle group into two groups for a more nuanced analysis. The final 
number of observations retained by Mplus following listwise deletion is 3,124 individuals, 
down from 3,409. The Maximum Likelihood algorithm uses all the information available. 
Moreover, it assumes that the data is missing at random. 
 
 A complete case analysis was preferred to one which allowed for item missingness because 
the objective of this study is to measure underlying science knowledge using all of the 
knowledge items in the two waves of the survey. In addition, age-related measurement 
invariance with regard to each of the items is investigated. In order to be able to make 
significant comparisons across all items, one has to examine the same individuals, who have 
data on all items. If different individuals with data on only a subset of the items are used, 
comparisons for each item are invalid because those individuals’ underlying level of 
knowledge is given by what is essentially a different scale, composed of only a subset of 
items. It would render judgements about invariance in relation to each item, and across all 
items, in the battery invalid. One limitation is that the discarded data might not be missing at 
random, and item non-response has introduced bias in assessing the overall level of 
knowledge. This study should only be regarded as an exercise in testing for measurement 
invariance in relation to this specific battery of knowledge items. Findings should only be 
interpreted in relation to the remaining sample and its associated characteristics presented in 
Table 2.0.  No claims of representativeness are made. 
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2.2.3. Research Questions 
In the absence of much previous research on age-related bias in science knowledge scales, 
three research questions were set instead of formulating hypotheses.  
 
Q1: How many latent classes emerge from the data? Do the latent classes appear to be 
ordered in terms of their conditional probabilities? If yes, how many underlying dimensions 
can be inferred from the latent classes derived from the data?  
Q2: What is the extent of any potential age-related bias? In other words, are the items 
invariant across the three age groups? Who are these items better or worse for? Are older 
respondents more likely to give a ‘don’t know’ response? 
Q3: For future Wellcome Trust Monitor Surveys, what recommendations can be made for 
the design of this battery of questions? 
 2.2.4. Analytical Approach 
Science knowledge cannot be directly observed, which is why it is called a latent variable. 
What we do observe are the ten items, called indicator/manifest variables, intended to 
encapsulate this construct. By examining the pattern of associations amongst these manifest 
variables we can infer there is an underlying latent variable (or more; for instance, to 
distinguish between an information/misinformation dimension and one of ‘don’t know’/lack 
of information) (Bollen, 1989; Bartholomew, Knott, and Moustaki, 2011; Skrondal and 
Rabe-Hesketh, 2004). The purpose of a measurement model is to describe how well the 
indicator/manifest variables serve as a measurement instrument for the latent variables. 
Moreover, they allow for measurement error, and provide indications for potential ways in 
which the measurements can be improved.  
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2.2.4.1. Multi-group Latent Class Analysis (LCA) 
All items are treated as nominal. No a priori assumption about the ordering of categories is 
made. A multi-group latent class model can be estimated using three different types of 
parameterisation: logistic, probabilistic, and log-linear. MPlus estimates it as a multinomial 
logistic regression model with ten nominal observed variables as independent variables, and 
a categorical latent variable as the dependent variable. The goal is to categorise respondents 
into latent classes using the manifest indicators that best differentiate between classes 
(Nylund, Asparouhov, and Muthén, 2007). Maximum Likelihood estimation was used for all 
models. The multi-group models were estimated using age group as a covariate, as it is a 
more flexible approach. The results are then post-processed in R and the logits obtained in 
MPlus are converted into probabilities, as their interpretation is far more intuitive (Kuha, 
2013). The basic multi-group latent class measurement model can take the following form: 
η is a categorical latent variable with c unordered categories or classes (c=1,...C) 
𝒚𝒋 are categorical observed indicators (𝒚𝒋 =1,…,p) with 𝑳𝒋  possible levels (l=1,… 𝑳𝒋) 
g is a categorical observed variable that is treated as a predictor of η 
η𝑐= P(η=c), c=1,…,C                                                                                                             (1) 
πjl(c) = P(𝑦𝑗= l∣η = c)                                                                                                             (2) 
We are interested in modelling two types of probabilities:  
 Prior probabilities of belonging to class c (1) 
 Conditional response probabilities (2) – the probability of responding in category l to 
item j, given membership of latent class c 
 22 
 
In order to investigate measurement invariance I add age groups (g) as covariates. These are 
specified as three dummy variables, with the older group as the reference group. Conditional 
probabilities help us reach a substantive interpretation of the classes by examining the 
patterns of responses. For instance, if respondents in a class have very high probabilities of 
saying they don’t know, then we can label this as a ‘don’t know’ or ‘lack of information’ 
class. Class probabilities tell us the proportion of people that fall into a particular class c. 
After inspecting class and conditional response probabilities for the model estimated on the 
pooled sample, a latent class model is estimated in each of the three age groups to find the 
model that best fits the data in each group separately. Once construct equivalence has been 
established (whether the classes have similar interpretations in all groups), we can proceed to 
investigate measurement invariance. The multi-group analyses start with a model where the 
measurement model is held equal across groups. Since MPlus uses the logistic 
parameterisation, intercepts and loadings are fixed to be equal in all groups. This analysis is 
exploratory by nature, so no part of the measurement model was fixed to specific values. 
Next, a model where everything is free to vary (unconstrained) is estimated and compared to 
the fully constrained model. If it is deemed to be better, the next step is to examine each item 
in turn to see where the misfit stems from. Moreover, intercepts, and then intercepts and 
loadings, are freed for each item in turn, examining fit statistics to see if the model fits better 
than the fully constrained model. By freeing intercepts, we model a direct effect between age 
group and response probabilities to any given item. In layman’s terms, an older respondent 
might be more likely than a younger respondent to say ‘don’t know’ to an item, regardless of 
class membership. Only freeing a slope/intercept allows the relationship between an item 
and the categorical latent variable to vary by group. By freeing both intercepts and 
loadings/slopes we allow an interaction between latent class, group, and response 
probabilities to an item. What this allows is the effect of age group on response probabilities 
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to items to vary across the latent classes. The item could have a dissimilar interpretation in 
relation to the latent variable in different groups (McCutcheon, 1987). 
2.2.4.2. Model Fit 
How well a model fits the data can be assessed in a number of ways. I used the Akaike 
Information Criterion (AIC), the sample-adjusted Bayesian Information Criterion (BIC), the 
likelihood ratio test, and the bootstrapped likelihood ratio test (BLRT) (Asparouhov and 
Muthén, 2012; Kuha, 2013; McCutheon, 1987; Hagenaars and McCutcheon, 2002; Kankaras 
and Moors, 2009, Nylund et al., 2007). The AIC and BIC formulas used by Mplus are: 
AIC=-2logL+2*r                                                                                                                     (3) 
where logL is the log-likelihood value, and r is the number of free parameters; 
BIC=2logL+p*ln(n)                                                                                                                (4) 
Where p is the number of parameters and n is the sample size; 
Various models are compared using these indices, with the smallest value on any given 
index denoting the model that fits the data best. The two indices do not always agree, 
however. The BIC is a better indicator of the number of classes than the AIC, so it will 
receive more attention (Nylund et al., 2007). 
The likelihood ratio test for nested models compares the log-likelihood of two nested 
models, and it provides an LR test statistic, which is referred to the chi-square distribution 
with a number of degrees of freedom (the difference in the number of parameters estimated 
in the two models). The LR statistic has an associated p-value (if <0.05 then the first model 
is rejected in favour of the second model); this test is not available in MPlus so it is 
conducted in R using the ‘lcat’ post-processing functions. It is used to compare more 
restricted models with less restricted models, such as when a parameter is free (Kuha, 2013). 
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The bootstrapped likelihood ratio test (BLRT) is used to select the appropriate number of 
classes; it compares a model with k-1 classes to a model with k classes. It achieves this by 
computing a test statistic based on the -2*loglikelihood difference between the two models; 
it also has an associated p-value which helps decide if the k-1 classes model is rejected in 
favour of the k classes model.  
LCA was chosen for two primary reasons. First, the normal linear factor model is 
inappropriate when dealing with categorical manifest variables, and the reasons for that have 
been widely discussed in the literature (Bartholomew et al., 2011). Second, since science 
knowledge is postulated to be a continuous measure, latent trait models were deemed 
appropriate and were estimated first, but failed to converge. Increasing the number of starts 
until a maximum of 5000 was reached, increasing the number of iterations, setting stscale to 
1, or building the model in blocks by estimating separate models in the three groups to only 
bring it all together in the last step, as per the Mplus User Guide (Muthén and Muthén, 1998-
2010), were all futile attempts. With a latent class model we can still infer that there is an 
underlying continuous measure if the latent classes appear to be ordered in terms of their 
conditional response probabilities, even though the latent variable itself is not ordinal in 
nature. Finally, multi-group LCA offers considerably more flexibility than latent trait 
analysis, the factor model, or item response theory models, in which stronger distributional 
assumptions have to be satisfied (Kankaras and Moors, 2009). 
 2.3. Results 
 
 
An analysis of the pooled data reveals a common 4-class structure in terms of the BIC 
statistic, and five according to the BLRT (Table 2.1). Separate analyses of the three age 
groups reveal a 3-class model to best fit the data for the young group in terms of the BIC and 
the BLRT. For the middle group a three-class solution also appears to fit the data better 
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according to all fit diagnostic statistics, whereas a 4-class structure emerges for the third 
group, aged 50+, according to all fit statistics. Table 2.2 provides fit statistics for all analyses 
conducted separately in the three groups.   
 


































*model not identified 
The three classes also appear to be ordered in terms of their conditional probabilities, 
ranging from the least knowledgeable in class 1, with individuals in this class having very 
high probabilities of saying they don’t know the answer (and so professing ignorance; 
henceforth the ‘don’t know class’). The common denominator for the second and third 
classes is the respondents’ propensity to offer a substantive response to the question. 
Moreover, individuals in the second class have mixed probabilities of offering correct and 
wrong answers, the former being generally higher than the latter (henceforth the ‘medium 
knowledge class’). 
The same applies to the third class (henceforth the ‘high knowledge class’), except the 
probabilities of offering substantively correct answers are higher than in the medium 
knowledge class. For older respondents, aged 50 and over, a 4-class model fits the data 
better. The fourth class would substantively fit between the first and second class of the 





In other words, some older respondents fall into an additional class where they offer a 











     
Young (14-18 years old)     
2 classes 540 <0.001 13328 13523 
3 classes 155 <0.001 13214 13509 
4 classes* 151 0.24 13105 13500 
5 classes 65 0.67 13082 13577 
Middle (19-49 years old)     
2 classes 1130 <0.001 18512 18722 
3 classes 190 <0.001 18365 18682 
4 classes 139 0.38 18268 18692 
5 classes 68 <0.001 18242 18774 
Older (50+ years old)     
2 classes 1505 <0.001 21117 21329 
3 classes 377 <0.001 20781 21103 
4 classes 198 <0.001 20626 21056 
5 classes 64 <0.001 20604 21143 
          
*model not identified 
substantive response, and not just an outright ‘don’t know’. However, their probabilities of 
offering a correct answer are much lower than those of individuals in the medium knowledge 
class for the 3-class solution.  Thus, it appears that they are a bit more spread out across 
classes than young respondents or those in the 19-49 age group, which is in keeping with the 
common structure found in the pooled sample.   
Even though the model for the older group differs slightly in that it presents an additional 
class, resembling an intermediate knowledge level between the first and second classes of 
the three-class solution, construct equivalence is not violated as LCA is more flexible than 
other approaches, such as Latent Trait Analysis or Confirmatory Factor Analysis. LCA 
permits the estimation of models with more classes in one or more groups, setting the 
proportion to 0 in the additional class(es) for the groups where fewer classes provide the 
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best-fitting model (Kankaras and Moors, 2009). This was achieved using the ‘Training’ 
option in MPlus (Muthén and Muthén, 1998-2010). The multi-group models testing for 
invariance were estimated with three classes for individuals in the young and middle age 
groups, and four classes for the third age group. For the first two groups the proportion was 
set to 0 for the fourth class, meaning that respondents aged 14-18 and 19-49, respectively, 
were not allocated to this last class.  
Prior probabilities for all three groups are shown in Table 2.3. It is apparent that there are 
only 0.1% more older respondents in the ‘don’t know’ class than there are middle-aged 
people. The proportion of older people in this class is a bit over double that of younger 
respondents, though. Most young respondents are in the medium knowledge class; 50% of 
middle-aged people fall in the most knowledgeable class, with older respondents not too far 
behind. It seems that a higher proportion of older respondents are allocated to the last class, 
compared to younger respondents. Table 2.4a presents the conditional response probabilities 
for the three groups. Table 2.4b shows probabilities for the 4
th
 class fitted for older 
respondents.  The conditional probabilities for older respondents are from the final 4-class 
model estimated for this group.  The differences between the conditional probabilities 
derived from a four-class model and the conditional probabilities obtained in a three-class 
solution are so small that it makes no substantive difference whatsoever (mostly at the 0.01 
level).   
The pattern of conditional probabilities across the three groups was deemed to be similar 
enough to warrant proceeding to test for measurement invariance. 
A few items have reverse probabilities for one or two of the age groups in some classes, 
however. The first item that exhibits this problem is ‘electrons’ in the medium knowledge 
class, where young respondents have a very high probability of giving a substantive, correct, 
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answer; respondents in the second and third groups have very high probabilities of saying 
they don’t know. 





















Younger 0.07 0.69 0.24 0.00 
Middle 0.14 0.36 0.50 0.00 
Older 0.15 0.10 0.42 0.33 
*derived from the multi-group model 
        
A similar pattern can be observed in the don’t know class for the item ‘plants’, and the 
medium knowledge class for items ‘mice’ and ‘lasers’. For the don’t know class, item 
‘oxygen’, it is only older respondents who have high probabilities of giving a ‘don’t know’ 
answer. For the medium knowledge class, item ‘mice’, something similar occurs, except the 
difference between probabilities of giving a substantive answer or saying ‘don’t know’ is not 
very substantial. The same stays true for the same item in the high knowledge class, but only 
for the young respondents. Moreover, this also seems to apply to the older respondents for 
the ‘mother’s genes’ item, the medium knowledge class, who do not have very disparate 
probabilities of giving a correct, incorrect, or ‘don’t know’ answer. The same can be 
observed regarding young respondents’ probabilities of answering correctly or incorrectly 
the question on controlled experiments in the high knowledge class. The difference in the 
conditional probabilities is not very large.  It is then obvious that some of these questions do 
not work exactly the same in some classes for the selected three age groups (highlighted in 
the table). In other words, some of these items seem relatively independent across groups. 
Given this finding, further investigation into the source of this seeming non-equivalence is 
warranted. In the first instance, the fully constrained model (where all parameters are held 
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equal across groups) was tested against a model where all parameters are free to vary (Table 
2.5). The likelihood ratio test, the AIC, and the BIC, all reject the model where everything is 
held equal in favour of the fully unconstrained model. The next step was to identify the items 
that cause the most trouble. In other words, to ascertain the greatest source of misfit. To 
check this, likelihood ratio tests were conducted where each item was freed in turn. In the 
first instance, only intercepts were allowed to vary across the three groups for each item in 
turn. 
Then each model, where the intercept for each item was allowed to vary across groups, was 
tested against the fully constrained model to see if by freeing that item there was any 
significant improvement in how well the model fits the data.  The items are ordered going 
from the best to the worst fitting models, compared to the fully constrained model. If freeing 
the intercept for an item provides a significant improvement in fit, then we can accept that 
model as the better model. All fit statistics reject the constrained model (everything equal), 
in favour of the models where a direct effect from group to each item is allowed (Table 2.6).  
Subsequently, both intercepts and slopes were allowed to vary across groups for each item in 
turn. This essentially means that an interaction between latent class, group, and item is 
allowed. Each model was then tested against the equal measurement model. It is clear from 
table 2.7 that the likelihood ratio test, the AIC, and the BIC, all reject the constrained model 
in favour of each model where both intercepts and slopes were free to vary. The items are 
again ordered in terms of improvement in fit, with the first one providing the biggest 
improvement in fit. Thus, all these questions appear to work differently for these three age 
groups. As a last step, for each item, the model allowing a direct effect was tested against the 




Table 2.4a Conditional probabilities for each group separately for three classes 
  
 






















 correct 0.11/ 0.03/ 0.00 0.81/ 0.21/ 0.13 0.55/ 0.60/ 0.55 
 incorrect 0.00/ 0.04/ 0.00 0.18/ 0.13/ 0.09 0.26/ 0.30/ 0.26 
 don'tknow 0.89/ 0.94/ 1.00 0.02/ 0.65/ 0.78 0.18/ 0.09/ 0.16 
k2 Radioactivity    
 correct 0.05/ 0.00/ 0.02 0.89/ 0.40/ 0.37 0.59/ 0.82/ 0.95 
 incorrect 0.27/ 0.10/ 0.07 0.11/ 0.27/ 0.30 0.28/ 0.18/ 0.03 
 don'tknow 0.68/ 0.90/ 0.91 0.00/ 0.33/ 0.33 0.13/ 0.00/ 0.02 
k3 Plants    
 correct 0.63/ 0.38/ 0.34 0.96/ 0.92/ 0.84 0.90/ 0.93/ 0.95 
 incorrect 0.00/ 0.10/ 0.01 0.03/ 0.03/ 0.02 0.08/ 0.06/ 0.03 
 don'tknow 0.37/ 0.60/ 0.65 0.01/ 0.04/ 0.14 0.02/ 0.01/ 0.02 
k4 Mice    
 correct 0.11/ 0.11/ 0.01 0.55/ 0.33/ 0.43 0.17/ 0.63/ 0.71 
 incorrect 0.10/ 0.06/ 0.02 0.30/ 0.33/ 0.12 0.48/ 0.22/ 0.09 
 don'tknow 0.79/ 0.78/ 0.97 0.16/ 0.45/ 0.45 0.35/ 0.15/ 0.19 
k5 Cloning    
 correct 0.17/ 0.22/ 0.12 0.92/ 0.64/ 0.72 0.65/ 0.81/ 0.90 
 incorrect 0.00/ 0.00/ 0.00 0.07/ 0.10/ 0.05 0.20/ 0.15/ 0.07 
 don'tknow 0.83/ 0.78/ 0.88 0.02/ 0.26/ 0.23 0.15/ 0.03/ 0.03 
k6 Oxygen    
 correct 0.69/ 0.51/ 0.30 0.94/ 0.85/ 0.77 0.88/ 0.87/ 0.82 
 incorrect 0.08/ 0.05/ 0.03 0.06/ 0.08/ 0.14 0.11/ 0.12/ 0.16 
 don'tknow 0.23/ 0.44/ 0.67 0.00/ 0.07/ 0.10 0.02/ 0.01/ 0.03 
k7 Lasers    
 correct 0.06/ 0.00/ 0.00 0.60/ 0.19/ 0.15 0.33/ 0.62/ 0.72 
 incorrect 0.03/ 0.00/ 0.04 0.17/ 0.26/ 0.32 0.36/ 0.21/ 0.16 
 don'tknow 0.96/ 0.94/ 0.96 0.22/ 0.55/ 0.54 0.31/ 0.18/ 0.13 
k8 GM fruit    
 correct 0.05/ 0.05/ 0.08 0.86/ 0.63/ 0.47 0.61/ 0.85/ 0.86 
 incorrect 0.14/ 0.01/ 0.08 0.12/ 0.10/ 0.15 0.17/ 0.10/ 0.04 
 don'tknow 0.81/ 0.94/ 0.84 0.03/ 0.28/ 0.38 0.22 /0.05/ 0.10 
k9 Mother's genes    
 correct 0.32/ 0.33/ 0.19 0.82/ 0.59/ 0.44 0.60/ 0.74/ 0.71 
 incorrect 0.16/ 0.19/ 0.04 0.13/ 0.16/ 0.23 0.25/ 0.18/ 0.16 
 don'tknow 0.52/ 0.49/ 0.77 0.05/ 0.26/ 0.34 0.15/0.08/ 0.13 
k10 Experiments    
 correct 0.23/ 0.24/ 0.27 0.77 /0.55/ 0.55 0.42 /0.77/ 0.89 
 incorrect 0.42/ 0.37/ 0.41  0.21 /0.40/ 0.41 0.54 /0.21/ 0.09 
 don'tknow 0.36/ 0.39/ 0.31 0.02 / 0.05/ 0.04 0.05 /0.01/ 0.04 
     









k1 correct 0.44 
 incorrect 0.34 
 don'tknow 0.22 
k2 Radioactivity  
 correct 0.43 
 incorrect 0.48 
 don'tknow 0.09 
k3 Plants  
 correct 0.74 
 incorrect 0.23 
 don'tknow 0.03 
k4 Mice  
 correct 0.53 
 incorrect 0.45 
 don'tknow 0.03 
k5 Cloning  
 correct 0.61 
 incorrect 0.34 
 don'tknow 0.05 
k6 Oxygen  
 correct 0.71 
 incorrect 0.26 
 don'tknow 0.03 
k7 Lasers  
 correct 0.39 
 incorrect 0.53 
 don'tknow 0.08 
k8 GM fruit  
 correct 0.69 
 incorrect 0.24 
 don'tknow 0.07 
k9 Mother's genes  
 correct 0.61 
 incorrect 0.34 
 don'tknow 0.05 
k10 Experiments  
 correct 0.41 
 incorrect 0.56 
 don'tknow 0.02 






















1 Measurement model equal -26398 394 6 <0.001 52962 53471 
2 vs Unconstrained -26201    52580 53126 
* logL =log likelihood; H0: measurement model equal; H1: measurement model free to vary 
across groups 
 













Direct effect only *      
 
Electrons  
498 10 <0.001 52484 53055 
Mice 448 10 <0.001 52534 53104 
Oxygen 436 10 <0.001 52546 53117 
Lasers 429 10 <0.001 52553 53124 
Plants  415 10 <0.001 52567 53137 
Mother's genes 411 10 <0.001 52571 53142 
Radioactivity  408 10 <0.001 52574 53144 
GM fruit 408 10 <0.001 52574 53144 
Cloning 403 10 <0.001 52579 53150 
Experiments 402 10 <0.001 52580 53150 
      
*H0: constrained model; H1: direct effect for each item; 
 
Table 2.8 shows the results of the likelihood ratio tests. For the items ‘mice’, ‘cloning’, 
‘mother’s genes’, ‘radioactivity’, ‘GM fruit’, and ‘lasers’, the model allowing only a direct 
effect is rejected in favour of the model allowing both intercepts and slopes to vary across 
groups. On the other hand, for items ‘plants’, ‘experiments’, ‘electrons’, ‘oxygen’, the model 
only freeing intercepts is not rejected by the likelihood ratio test. Looking at the BIC statistic 
for the direct effect models and the interaction models, the models where only intercepts are 
freed fit the data better. Put differently, there is evidence that the relationship between these 
items and the categorical latent variable varies by age; however, this is not extended to the 
item being interpreted completely differently by people from distinct age groups. 
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Interaction*       
 
Electrons 
507 20 <0.001 52495 53127 
Mice 495 20 <0.001 52507 53139 
Lasers 448 20 <0.001 52554 53186 
Oxygen 441 20 <0.001 52561 53193 
Cloning 437 20 <0.001 52565 53197 
Mother’s genes 435 20 <0.001 52567 53199 
Plants 430 20 <0.001 52572 53204 
Radioactivity 430 20 <0.001 52572 53204 
GM fruit 428 20 <0.001 52575 53206 
Experiments 415 20 <0.001 52586 53218 
      
*H0: constrained model; H1: interaction for each item 
 









Direct effect versus interaction*    
 
Mice 
47 10 <0.001 
Cloning 34 10 <0.001 
Mother's genes 24 10 <0.05 
Radioactivity  22 10 <0.05 
GM fruit 20 10 <0.05 
Lasers 19 10 <0.05 
Plants  15 10    0.13 
Experiments 14 10    0.19 
Electrons  10 10    0.46 
Oxygen 5 10    0.89 
    
*H0: Direct effect, H1: Interaction; 
 
The non-invariance found seems to be related to people from different age groups having 
different probabilities of giving a correct response, which is a measurement issue. It does 
not, however, appear to extend to a potentially different substantive interpretation of the 
question altogether by individuals from the three age groups selected here. Nonetheless, the 
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non-equivalence found is significant seeing that the most severe form extends to six out of 
the ten items. 
2.4. Sensitivity Analysis 
 
Now that measurement non-invariance in relation to age has been discovered, as well as a 
class of people who say they don’t know rather than give outright incorrect answers, it is 
important to ascertain whether employing a latent variable framework, which accounts for 
this, when predicting an attitudinal outcome makes a substantive difference. In other words, 
would we draw different conclusions about a substantive issue than if we just used the 
summed scale approach? 
2.4.1 An attitudinal measure and science knowledge 
To test this, I look at attitudes to genetics. It is one of the very few attitudinal questions that 
is asked of both young people and adults in the Wellcome Trust Monitor Surveys. 
Respondents are asked in both Wave I and II: ‘How optimistic are you about the possibility 
of improved healthcare as a result of genetic research. Are you…?’. The response options 
are: 1. Very optimistic; 2. Somewhat optimistic; 3. Not too optimistic; 4. Not at all 
optimistic. This was recoded into a binary variable by collapsing the first two and then the 
last two negative categories into one representing each type of attitude (Very/somewhat 
optimistic=83%; Not too/not at all optimistic=17%). The reference category represents 
positive attitudes towards genetics. A dummy variable is used for parsimony. This analysis is 
not intended as a robust way to shed empirical light on public attitudes to genetics. It is 
merely a test of what substantive conclusions can be drawn from using a latent variable 
framework compared to using a summed score approach. 
Science knowledge was operationalised in three different ways. First, a three-class model 
accounting for the age-related measurement non-invariance explained in the previous 
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sections was used. Three classes are used instead of four because the forth is not of great 
substantive interest. It was only found for the older group, the probabilities of response fit in 
between classes 2 and 3, without making much of a difference, so the more parsimonious 3-
class model was used for the purpose of this short sensitivity analysis. Second, a summed 
scale was created from recoding all ten knowledge items into correct and incorrect 
responses, as is the usual approach in PUS literature (M=6.49; SD=2.18). Higher scores 
translate into more knowledge. This was also then recoded as a categorical variable with 
three categories: low (0-3); medium (4-7); high (8-10). The conversion to a categorical 
variable was done in order to render it more comparable to the latent class variable.  The 
categories were created bearing in mind the nature of the latent classes (so the range of 
probabilities of response explained in the previous sections). This is, of course, not a perfect 
representation of the latent class variable, and it can never be that. Nevertheless, the ranges 




In both analyses gender is included as a covariate, in addition to age. Gender is included as a 
dummy variable with men as the reference category (female=56%; male=44%). The same 
age categories are included in the analysis using the summed knowledge measure with over 
50s as the reference category. Educational attainment was not included because it is 
measured differently for adults and young people. The latter have a proxy measure of 
parents’ highest educational achievement. It is implausible that an extra covariate would 
significantly alter the comparability of results. In the latent class model used here the science 
knowledge items are allowed to vary across the three age groups, thus accounting for the 
measurement non-equivalence identified in the previous step. 
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2.4.3 Analytical Approach 
 
Binary logistic regressions are estimated. The logistic regressions using the summed 
knowledge measure (both the continuous and categorical version) are estimated in R. 
Because entropy is <0.8, the latent class logistic regressions are carried out in MPlus in a 1-
step estimation of the latent classes. All indicators are free to vary across age groups, gender 
is added as another covariate, and the distal outcome is attitudes to genetics. The 1-step 
approach is preferred over extracting class membership and using that in a subsequent 
analysis. This is in line with recommendations in the literature. Extracting class information 
(to be used in a subsequent analysis) using the modal assignment rule with an entropy value 
lower than 0.8 (or as a general more robust estimation technique) would lead to smaller and 
biased standard errors and narrow confidence intervals. This renders significance tests 
unstable (Clark and Muthén, 2009). 
2.4.4 Results 
 
Table 2.9 shows results from the logistic regression models. The table shows odds ratios 
from the latent class model as well as from the analysis using the summed score approach. In 
model (1), the reference category is ‘medium knowledge’ for both the LCA and summed 
score analyses. In other words, the ‘don’t know' class is compared to the medium knowledge 
class. The low knowledge category from the recoded knowledge scale is also compared to 
the medium kno 
wledge category. In model (2)’ the reference category is the high knowledge class for the 
LCA analysis, and the high knowledge category for the summed score analysis using 
knowledge as categorical. Thus, the ‘don’t know’ and medium knowledge classes are 


















Note:*p<0.1; **p<0.05; ***p<0.01; N=3,124. 
 
The low and medium knowledge categories are compared to the high knowledge category. 
Knowledge is used as a scale ranging from 0 to 10 in model (3).  
Odds ratios for both types of parameterisation of the model are very similar indeed. Across 
the board, people with lower levels of knowledge have higher odds of having a negative 
attitude towards genetics. The same story is confirmed in the model using knowledge as a 
continuous scale where going up a point on the knowledge scale decreases the odds of 
saying they are not optimistic about genetic research. In short, the odds ratios for both model 
parameterisations using the latent classes and comparable categories representing low, 
                              
                           Attitudes to Genetics (ref: positive) 
    
                                     
                                             Ref: medium         Ref: high        Continuous 
    
                          
                                                                     (1)                          (2)                          (3)     
    
     
 
LCA:                     
    
     
Don’t know class(C1)         1.751***   4.494***     
     
Medium knowledge(C2)                    2.567***     
     
     
SUMMED SCORE: 
 
    
Low knowledge                2.051***   3.841***     
     
Medium knowledge                        1.873***     
     
Knowledge scale                                    0.801***     
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medium, high knowledge are very similar. The results using knowledge as a scale also leads 





This study set out to meet two primary goals. First, to uncover measures of information, lack 
of information, and misinformation, using the battery of ten science knowledge items 
administered in the Wellcome Trust Monitor Surveys. This is done in order to epitomise 
people’s knowledge in a more nuanced, meaningful and representative manner. Second, to 
test whether the ten knowledge items exhibit measurement invariance across three age 
groups: 14-18 year olds, 19-49 year olds, and people aged over 50, respectively. This is done 
so as to avoid potentially erroneous conclusions about their levels of knowledge about 
science, biology and genetics in particular. A subsidiary goal set was to provide some 
recommendations regarding this battery for future waves of the survey.  
A multi-group latent class model was employed to answer the following three research 
questions posited: 1) How many classes emerge from the data? Do the latent classes appear 
to be ordered in terms of their conditional probabilities? If yes, how many underlying 
dimensions can be inferred from the latent classes derived from the data?; 2) What is the 
extent of any potential age-related bias? In other words, are the items invariant across the 
three age groups? Are older respondents more likely to give a ‘don’t know’ response; 3) For 
future Wellcome Trust Monitor Surveys, what recommendations can be made for the design 
of this battery of questions?  
In order to answer the first question, I inspected the latent structure that emerged from the 
data, as well as the classes’ substantive interpretation given by the pattern of conditional 
probabilities. Analysis of the pooled sample revealed a common 4-class structure as fitting 
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the data best in terms of the BIC. Separate analyses in the three age groups reveal a slightly 
different picture of the latent structures emerging from this data. Younger and middle-age 
respondents were classified into three classes, showing a tendency of increasing knowledge 
in terms of the apparent ordering of the conditional response probabilities. The first class 
represents a lack of information class because of very high conditional probabilities of 
answering ‘don’t know’ to all items. Given this information, on the surface it seems that it 
might be a mistake to group these answers with incorrect answers, as is the most common 
practice in PUS studies. Empirically, they seem to represent different entities.  However, the 
second class appears to be fairly knowledgeable, and probabilities of answering incorrectly 
are not large at all, which means it cannot represent a misinformation class. The third and 
last class is the most knowledgeable class, where conditional probabilities of answering 
correctly are very high.  
Older respondents can be classified into four classes. Three classes have the same 
interpretation as for the other two age groups, but a fourth class comes somewhere between 
the first and second classes. Thus, it appears that their underlying knowledge spans across 
more levels. We could also say that it goes up in more increments than for the other two 
groups. Practically, this does not make a substantive difference; empirically, LCA is flexible 
enough to allow multi-group models to be estimated with different numbers of classes for 
one or some of the groups, so I could proceed to investigate measurement invariance 
(Kankaras et al., 2009). I can posit that two sub-dimensions of an underlying knowledge 
continuum emerge from the data inferred from how the classes appear to be ordered in terms 
of the conditional response probabilities. A ‘don’t know’ class represents one, and the other 
dimension is represented by the other two classes (three for older respondents), which 
underpin a continuum of fairly good to high level of knowledge.   
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To answer the second question, a model where everything was held equal across groups was 
compared to one where everything was free to vary. Seeing as that fit the data better, I 
proceeded to search for the items that caused the most trouble (in terms of the amount of 
misfit provided). The results from the multi-group LCA show that all ten knowledge items 
are to some extent non-invariant across the three age groups. In other words, this battery of 
questions exhibits very strong age-related bias. This means that any observed differences 
might not indicate true differences. The models allowing the conditional response 
probabilities to vary across groups, regardless of the latent class, are the best fitting models. 
The likelihood ratio tests indicate this for ‘plants’, ‘experiments’, ‘electrons’, and ‘oxygen’. 
Thus, individuals have different probabilities of answering these items correctly based on 
what age group they belong to.  
 To answer the last part of the second question postulated, I examined the prior probabilities 
and the conditional probabilities in the ‘don’t know’ class. Older respondents in this class do 
not have much higher probabilities of saying they don’t know than younger respondents in 
the same class. However, 15% of older respondents are allocated to this class, compared to 
only 7% of young respondents. So it seems that many more older respondents have a 
propensity to give a ‘don’t know’ answer compared to younger respondents, thus confirming 
some of the observations made in political science literature (Ferber, 1966; Gergen and 
Bock, 1966; Glenn, 1969; Francis and Busch, 1975). 
These items clearly need to be revised given the finding of a great amount of measurement 
non-invariance across the three age groups. There were also some differences in conditional 
probabilities for a few items in some classes. For instance, for ‘electrons’, the probabilities 
for younger and older respondents are reversed (high to give a correct response for young 
respondents, high to give a ‘don’t know’ answer for older respondents). Interestingly, the 
questions are administered separately to young respondents, as they are part of a boost 
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sample. Perhaps this is a reflection of how interviewers might treat them differently. Another 
possibility is that the information is just more fresh in their minds, given that most of them 
were probably still in school at the time of the interviews. Moreover, some of these items 
seem relatively independent across groups. This is based on the fact that the probabilities of 
giving a correct, incorrect, or ‘don’t know’ answer exhibit a high degree of similarity. In 
order words, the probability of giving a correct response is very close to that of giving an 
incorrect answer, or indeed of saying ‘don’t know’. The other items posing similar issues are 
‘plants’, ‘mice’, ‘lasers’, ‘oxygen’, ‘mother’s genes’, and ‘experiments’. Coincidentally, 
except the last one, they are also the ones which are the largest source of error in terms of the 
BIC. Interestingly, only ‘lasers’ has ‘false’ as the correct answer. It has been shown that 
these items are more difficult for respondents and can sometimes be more cognitively 
burdensome, although they do help distinguish between respondents more effectively (see 
Stares, 2008). One practical recommendation would be to revise these items, and perhaps 
include more with ‘false’ as the response option as they seem to fare better here. Finally, 
another recommendation is to conduct more cognitive pretesting to understand how 
respondents engage cognitively with questions where ‘false’ is the correct response. 
A sensitivity analysis was also conducted in order to ascertain whether the extent of 
measurement non-equivalence found in relation to age would bias substantive conclusions in 
analyses examining attitudes, for example. Binary logistic regressions were estimated using 
the latent class variable representing three incremental levels of knowledge, a summed 
knowledge scale, and a categorical variable representing low, medium, and high knowledge, 
akin to the latent class variable. Age and gender were used as covariates and measurement 
non-invariance was taken into account in the latent class logistic regression. The same 
substantive conclusions were reached using both types of modelling, so researchers can rest 
assured that using the summed score approach would not bias their conclusions regarding 
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issues of substantive interest. I reflect further on the implications of my findings in the 
‘Overall Conclusion’, which is in Chapter 5. 
In the next chapter I will examine education-based inequalities in science knowledge and 
biomedical self-efficacy. Science knowledge is used as a summed scale of correct and 
incorrect responses for two reasons. First, age-related differences in science knowledge are 
not the subject, so the measurement non-invariance in relation to age found here is not of 
concern; 2) the sensitivity analysis illustrated in Section 2.4 of the present chapter has shown 
that, substantively, either approach yields similar results. The latter gives me confidence that 
I only need to control for age in the subsequent analyses, and a latent variable framework is 
not necessary. Lastly, educational differences in science knowledge have been researched 
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3. Educational Disparities, Biomedical Efficacy and 
Science Knowledge Gaps: can the Internet help us reduce 
these inequalities? 
 
 3.1. Introduction 
 
 
The cultural authority of science stems from the fact that modern institutions rely on expert 
knowledge to assess risks, make decisions, and establish legitimacy (Shapin, 2008; Liu and 
Priest, 2009).  That being said, a society that is exhaustively reliant on expert knowledge 
without public involvement does not meet the democratic ideal. The basic tenet of a 
democracy is an active and informed citizenry, one which is equipped to comprehend basic 
scientific concepts and methods, and is aware of the main actors involved in science. This 
would enable those who are both willing and confident in their abilities to participate in the 
decision-making that has the potential to change their lives. They could, for instance, take 
part in public consultations regarding important policy matters, such as the regulation of 
medical research. 
However, social and economic differences lead to unequal access to, and use of, information. 
This has been a pressing issue for years, with the World Economic Forum (Bilbao-Osorio et 
al., 2011) declaring that it should be recognised as one of the primary challenges that 
democratic governments have to tackle. The issue has been examined quite extensively using 
the knowledge gap theory method. In principle, the knowledge gap hypothesis, proposed by 
Tichenor, Donohue, and Olien (1970), tests whether an augmentation in media attention can 
increase knowledge disparities between social groups with different educational 
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backgrounds. The three authors posit that people would acquire knowledge at different rates, 
with more educated citizens becoming more informed at a faster rate than less educated 
members of society. 
The existence of knowledge gaps has been tested in a variety of science domains, albeit less 
so in the biomedical/biotechnological realms. The measurement of knowledge has posed 
some particular issues. In essence, there is dissent in the field of Public Understanding of 
Science regarding how to assess understanding of scientific principles, facts, and actors. 
Factual knowledge measured with a series of true/false questions about textbook science 
knowledge has been the most commonly employed measure (e.g., Bonfadelli, 2002; 
Cacciatore, Scheufele and Corley, 2013; Ho, 2012). Other studies have shown preference for 
a measure of self-reported knowledge or perceived familiarity, where respondents are asked 
to rate how well informed they are about certain scientific issues (Kahan, Braman, Slovic, 
Gastil, and Cohen, 2009). And yet other researchers use them interchangeably (see Kahan et 
al., 2012). However, critics argue that the two concepts measure intrinsically different things 
and should not be employed together or as a replacement of each other. High factual 
knowledge does not always translate into high confidence in one’s own abilities /information 
(Ladwig et al., 2012; Su et al., 2014; Anderson et al., 2014). Essentially, knowledge gaps 
may differ significantly depending on the type of measure we employ, which would have an 
impact on the inferences researchers make about different sections of society. This could 
then lead to different, potentially inaccurate, policies (Su et al., 2014).  
We use a factual measure of knowledge of science, with a focus on biology and genetics. We 
also propose a more comprehensive measure than self-reported familiarity. The measure we 
put forth builds on two closely related concepts borrowed from political science literature, 
namely internal political efficacy and political information efficacy. By definition, internal 
political efficacy refers to personal beliefs regarding one’s own ability to understand and 
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participate effectively in politics (Craig, Niemi, Silver, 1990; Morrell, 2003; Niemi, Craig, 
Mattei, 1991). Thus, we retain the element of self-reported understanding of biomedicine 
and we add a component of willingness to participate in the decision-making process 
regarding medical research. We argue that the new construct, which we call biomedical self-
efficacy, or internal biomedical efficacy, offers a richer and better-rounded insight into 
people’s engagement with biomedicine. The next section will provide more insight into the 
political science origins of the concept. To the authors’ knowledge, biomedical self-efficacy 
has never been studied before. We found one PUS paper looking at nanotechnology efficacy, 
where it is treated as a predictor of risk perceptions, separate from perceived familiarity. 
However, a related notion, scientific citizenship, has been proposed in PUS (Mejlgaard 
2009; Mejlgaard and Stares, 2010, 2013).  Scientific citizenship differs from biomedical self-
efficacy in that it postulates interdependencies between factual knowledge and participation 
(Mejlgaard, 2009). Efficacy, however, focuses on subjective assessments of knowledge and 
willingness to participate in debates.  On caveat that needs to be made early on, however, is 
that preferences for participation have been found to not translate into actual participatory 
behaviour, as seen in Mejlgaard and Stares (2013). Ergo, any conclusions regarding an 
improvement in efficacy as meaning a better democracy where more people would actually 
participate are sadly not possible. We might be able to say that it can at least open up a more 
real possibility of them doing so. 
This study aims to examine the knowledge gap hypothesis using factual knowledge and 
biomedical self-efficacy. One of the primary goals is to examine in detail the processes 
underpinning education-related factual knowledge and self-efficacy gaps. This study also 
investigates the role played by general Internet use and attention to medical stories on the 
Internet in narrowing or widening factual knowledge and biomedical self-efficacy gaps. 
There have been mixed findings in relation to the Internet’s role in reducing knowledge 
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gaps. Some have found that the Internet can decrease (nanotechnology) knowledge gaps 
(Cacciatore et al., 2013), while others have advocated that the Internet enlarges gaps between 
low and high education groups (for example, Bonfadelli, 2002; Kim, 2008; Miller, 2001; 
partial evidence in Su et al., 2014). Some of these studies, however, only examine the impact 
that general Internet use has on knowledge gaps. This study adopts a more comprehensive 
approach to also examine how attention to medical stories online impacts education-based 
knowledge and internal biomedical efficacy gaps. An overview of the concept of internal 
political efficacy, on which we base that of biomedical self-efficacy, is imperative before 
any further exposition of the relationship between the Internet, biomedical self-efficacy, and 
science knowledge. 
3.1.1. Biomedical Self-Efficacy  
 
While biomedical self-efficacy is a measure first operationalised in this study, its 
conceptualisation is rooted in political science literature. Originally, the concept of "sense of 
political efficacy" was a unidimensional construct, defined as "the feeling that individual 
political action does have, can have, an impact upon the political process" (Campbell, Gurin 
and Miller, 1954:187). Subsequent theoretical and empirical work has demonstrated that the 
survey questions normally employed in measuring political efficacy actually represent two 
separate components. The first, internal efficacy, refers to individual beliefs regarding one's 
own competence to comprehend and take part effectively in politics. The second, external 
efficacy, measures beliefs about how responsive governmental bodies are to citizen demands 
(Craig, Niemi, Silver, 1990; Morrell, 2003; Niemi, Craig, Mattei, 1991). Kaid, McKinney, 
Tedesco (2007) propose a concept related to internal political efficacy, namely political 
information efficacy, which, unlike internal efficacy, has only one dimension. Information 
efficacy can be defined simply as citizens' confidence in their political knowledge and "its 
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sufficiency to engage in the political process" (Kaid, McKinney, Tedesco, 2007:1096; 
Tedesco, 2011).  
The closest concept to biomedical efficacy, as conceptualised here, in PUS is scientific 
citizenship, which relates objectively measured knowledge to participatory behaviours 
(Mejlgaard, 2009; Mejlgaard and Stares, 2010, 2013). For instance, in a cross-national 
analysis using the European Survey on Europeans, Science and Technology, Mejlgaard and 
Stares (2010) do no find a definitive model that fully captures scientific citizenship across a 
multitude of European contexts. Their participation component includes questions about 
whether respondents discuss science, whether they read articles on science, and whether they 
attend public meetings/debates about science. The last question is more akin to the 
participation component of efficacy, as conceptualised in the current Chapter. The other two 
elements of the participation component of scientific citizenship are similar to those I use in 
Chapter 3, where I reconceptualise efficacy slightly (due to data constraints). They also find 
evidence that subjective competence is associated with that they call ‘vertical participation’ 
(which aims to influence policy agendas). Unlike scientific citizenship, efficacy focuses on a 
self-assessed and reported competence measure. In addition, its participation component can 
be thought of as aiming to influence policy seeing that it asks about willingness to take part 
in public consultations regarding the regulation of medical research. Therefore, it is not 
surprising to see that these two types of components appear to work together better than 
factual knowledge and participation. However, this is only a national sample, and there are 
no issues with cross-cultural comparability, which is likely also part of the reason. 
Biomedical self-efficacy can thus be said to resemble the two efficacy measures used in 
political science more than scientific citizenship. It combines elements of internal efficacy 
and information efficacy. Biomedical self-efficacy has two components that work well in 
tandem. The first dimension or component refers to people's self-reported understanding of 
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three key terms in biomedicine, namely ‘DNA’, ‘Genetically modified’, and ‘Human 
Genome’, respectively. The second component relates to citizens' willingness to engage in 
public consultations regarding medical research. The ‘Method’ section details: a) the 
measurement properties and the statistical tests conducted to ascertain the empirical 
distinctness of biomedical self-efficacy; b) potential conceptual benefits, compared to the 
unidimensional self-reported familiarity measure. 
To the authors' knowledge, at the time of writing, biomedical self-efficacy has not been 
measured before. Efficacy has, however, been measured in relation to nanotechnology in one 
PUS study. Anderson et al. (2014) study the online incivility and risk perceptions of 
emerging technologies, treating nanotechnology as a predictor of perceptions. They measure 
nanotechnology efficacy with two ten-point items: ‘Nanotechnology seems so complicated 
that a person like me can’t really understand it’, and ‘I would need more information about 
nanotechnology before I could make any decisions about it’. They also include a measure of 
self-reported familiarity, treating it as a separate construct altogether. The strength of this 
study stems from combining what we consider to be two elements of the same underlying 
concept. We argue that this creates a better-rounded measure of people’s self-reported 
cognitive engagement with medicine and biomedicine, as well as their disposition towards 
taking part in decision-making about medical research.  
Furthermore, this study applies the knowledge gap hypothesis to both factual knowledge of 
science, with a focus on biology and genetics, and to biomedical self-efficacy. By comparing 
the impact of Internet use on both constructs, we expect to paint a more nuanced picture of 
the empirical realities of education-based inequalities. For instance, the discovery of efficacy 
gaps would have quite different policy implications. Knowledge does not always translate 
into confidence in one's abilities, or, indeed, a willingness to take part in the debate about 
medical research. Therefore, policy programmes only aiming to inform people cannot be the 
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sole answer to reducing inequalities.  Indeed, the present study offers a clearer picture of the 
role of the Internet in both informing citizens and stimulating their confidence in their 
competence and willingness to participate in the civic debates about medical research. To put 
it differently, increased information, confidence, and participation should all be encouraged, 
for what is the first without the other when it comes to fulfilling our democratic ideals. 
3.1.2. The Internet, Biomedical Self-Efficacy, and Science Knowledge 
 
In the beginning, the knowledge gap hypothesis was only applied to newspaper use. Later, 
studies were published that examined gaps in television use. Seeing that the Internet 
occupies such a primordial role in today's information society, in the last decade or so, more 
and more studies have investigated its impact on inequalities.  
The invention of the Internet has brought about changes in the media landscape that are 
consequential to the dynamic between audiences and science (Batts, Anthis, and Smith, 
2008). In Western countries, more and more people access the news online. The 
particularities of the online environment have a different impact on public response to 
scientific information and new discoveries or technologies. These specificities are 
underpinned by information being conveyed in a new manner, and in new formats that offer 
innovative conduits of communication. Characteristics of the new information environment 
include, but are not limited to, hyper textuality (using links to connect to other web pages), 
interactivity, and multi-mediality (videos, images, etc.) (Brossard, 2013). 
Of more importance to science audiences, however, is the fact that online information 
sources don’t distinguish between ‘news’ and ‘opinion’. For example, user-generated content 
(blogs, forums) is often an integral part of a news website. Thus, readers might find it 
difficult to disentangle the content in terms of what is scientific fact regarding, for instance, 
stem cell research, and what is the mere opinion of the blogger/forum participant. 
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Additionally, crowd-sourced content (such as Wikipedia) is also heavily present on the 
Internet. Coverage of scientific issues will differ significantly to that in more traditional mass 
media, such as newspapers. Another important feature of the Internet is the tailored nature of 
its content. In other words, people can choose to amend the terms of their online search for 
information to fit their pre-existing interests and knowledge. This might have interesting 
effects on citizens’ self-efficacy and understanding of science. Importantly, according to the 
Office for National Statistics (2015, 2016) there is evidence showing that a majority of 
people living in the United Kingdom use the Internet. Currently, about 87.9% of adults in the 
UK use the Internet (ONS, 2016).  
Back in 2012, when the data used in this study were collected, 68% of those aged over 16 in 
the UK used the Internet (ONS, 2012). Biomedicine and medical research are extremely 
prevalent in the online environment. Masic and Milinovic (2012) published a review of the 
multitude of online databases containing information about new and old discoveries in 
biomedicine. Their article shows that any person who wanted to access information about 
biomedicine and medical research online would have no difficulties in finding it. Moreover, 
Haustein et al. (2014) studied social media (Twitter) coverage of articles published on 
PubMed and Web of Science. They found evidence of very widespread coverage and 
circulation of biomedicine on Twitter, one of the most commonly used social media outlets. 
As a result, even if someone isn’t actively looking for information related to biomedicine, 
they are still likely to encounter it at some point in time. 
Be that as it may, the impact of the Internet on societal information discrepancies is still 
poorly understood and the evidence is mixed. This study aims to shed light on this important 
matter and further inform debates regarding the role of the Internet in reducing the deficit of 
information between the haves and the have-nots. Some researchers have found the Internet 
to be an equaliser in terms of information opportunities (i.e. Cacciatore et al., 2013; partial 
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evidence in Su et al., 2014). Yet others have argued that the Internet would in fact augment 
the digital divide, resulting in even larger information gaps between the rich and the poor. 
This is, presumably, because highly educated people would be better equipped to understand 
the information (see for example, Bonfadelli, 2002; Kim, 2008; Miller, 2001; partial 
evidence in Su et al., 2014).  Lee (2009) showed that the gap in health knowledge caused by 
different education levels increased at higher levels of Internet use. He found evidence of a 
stronger relationship between Internet use and health knowledge amongst those highly 
educated, compared to those low on the education scale. Kim (2008) found a similar pattern 
for cancer knowledge. Cacciatore et al. (2013) showed that Internet use and attention to 
science online served to close the nanotechnology knowledge gap between high and low 
socio-economic groups. In a study on the effect of the pattern of news consumption on 
science knowledge levels, Su et al. (2015) found that use of online news increased science 
knowledge, independent of educational level.  
Most of the studies applying the gap hypothesis only focus on factual knowledge measures. 
Su et al. (2014), however, compare factual and perceived knowledge. Moreover, they 
examine the effect of socio-economic status (SES), as determined by a combined measure of 
education and income, on factual and perceived nanotechnology knowledge gaps, and the 
differential influence of the mass media. Interestingly, they found that socio-economic status 
was only a predictor of factual knowledge, not of perceived knowledge. The authors also 
studied the impact of science blog use on SES-related factual and perceived knowledge gaps. 
As science blog use increased from ‘no use at all’ to ‘low levels of use’, the factual 
knowledge gap between high and low-SES groups diminished. At higher levels of use, the 
pattern reversed. 
To our knowledge, no studies have yet examined biomedical, or other science-related, self-
efficacy gaps. As a result, we turned to the political science literature for evidence related to 
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the relationship between Internet use, internal political efficacy and, a related concept, 
political information efficacy. Overall, the impact of Internet use on political efficacy and 
political information efficacy seems to be positive. For instance, Moeller, de Vreese, Esser, 
Kunz (2014) found that, for first-time voters in the Netherlands, actively participating in the 
communication process of political information online had a strong impact on their internal 
political efficacy. A number of studies have found a stable association between levels of 
Internet use, online interactivity, and increased internal political efficacy, as well as 
amplified political information efficacy (Tedesco, 2007; Tedesco, 2011). Others, however, 
have found that being exposed to information online is not enough (Scheufele and Nisbet, 
2002; Nisbet and Scheufele, 2004). For instance, Nisbet and Scheufele (2004) found that 
web exposure alone did not produce significant changes in efficacy. The authors showed that 
political information obtained online increased political efficacy only in combination with 
discussion.  
The problem with a lot of these studies has been an insufficient sample size (Boulianne, 
2009; Kenski and Stroud, 2006). Given that this study benefits from a very good sample 
size, we expect our results to be more robust. In order to bypass the issue of Internet 
exposure not being sufficient, we have included a measure for attention to medical research 
stories online, which taps into citizens’ cognitive engagement with the issue. 
Based upon the review of literature on the relationship between the Internet, education, 
knowledge, and efficacy exposed above, we formulate the following three hypotheses: 
H1: Higher education leads to a higher sense of biomedical efficacy and increased factual 
knowledge, compared to lower or no education. 
H2: Internet use and attention to medical research stories online will reduce the biomedical 
efficacy gap between lowly and highly educated individuals. 
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H3: Internet use and attention to medical research stories will narrow the science knowledge 
gap between lowly and highly educated individuals. 
3.1.3. Testing the Knowledge Gap Hypothesis 
 
Tichenor et al. (1970) put forward two methods of testing for knowledge gaps. The first 
methodology proposes to look at the relationship between knowledge and education over 
time. If we observe an increase in the strength of association between the two, as more mass 
media content about a subject is disseminated, then we can say we have observed the 
production of a knowledge gap. As our data are not longitudinal in nature, this method is 
inaccessible. The second technique proposed by Tichenor et al. (1970) uses cross-sectional 
data and compares the correlation between education and knowledge for different issues that 
have distinct media coverage. If the correlation between education and knowledge is higher 
for those issues covered more intensely, then a knowledge gap has formed.      
There is also a third method of testing for education-based gaps that relies on cross-sectional 
data and focuses on the individual, as opposed to aggregate measures of media exposure 
(used by Eveland and Scheufele, 2000, amongst others). If the correlation between socio-
economic variables and knowledge is stronger for respondents with high mass media use 
than for those with a low level of media use, then we can say we are observing a knowledge 
gap. There are at least two advantages to adopting this approach. Firstly, this study measures 
media use at the individual level. By doing so, actual news exposure can be gauged more 
accurately compared to using the macro approaches described above. Secondly, it allows us 
to include a wider range of potential explanatory factors, while holding media use constant 




 3.2. Method  
 
 
The data used in this study come from Wave II of the Wellcome Trust Monitor Survey. The 
Wellcome Trust Monitor is a triennial survey of adults and young people in the UK, based 
on a representative probability sample. Its main purpose is to provide a more accurate and 
nuanced picture of interest in, knowledge of, and attitudes to medical research, with a focus 
on biomedicine. Wellcome Monitor II took place in 2012 and interviews were conducted 
with 1,396 adults (aged 18+) and 460 young people (14-18 years old; 154 part of a ‘core’ 
sample and 306 of the ‘boost’ sample). We only use the adult sample because the questions 
of interest were not administered to the young sample. The response rate for Monitor II was 
52.6% for the adult sample (Clemence et al., 2013). 
A series of nested regression models were fitted to the data. In order to test the gap 
hypothesis, a set of interaction terms were created between our Internet use and attention 
variables, and education.  
The biomedical self-efficacy measure was created by summating responses to four questions. 
Three of those assess people’s self-rated understanding of key terms in biomedicine, namely 
‘DNA’, ‘Human Genome’, and ‘Genetically Modified’. The fourth evaluates their 
participation, or rather willingness to participate (used interchangeably henceforth), in public 
consultations about medical research (M=6.9, SD=2.94). In an effort to build a more robust 
measure of internal efficacy, we also explored associations between these four variables and 
other variables that were suspected to be related to them. These measured the following 
concepts: 1) people’s self-rated understanding of ethical issues in biomedical research; 2) 
whether responsibility regarding what to do about obesity and getting vaccinated lies with 
the public; 3) if anyone involved in decision-making about medical research should be well 
informed about the science involved; 4) willingness to participate in medical research. 
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Unfortunately, these avenues proved to be unfruitful as these variables did not exhibit any 
association with the four core measures of the construct. 
Based on the moderate correlations found among the final four variables, an Exploratory 
Factor Analysis (EFA) was conducted. The result was one underlying dimension (one 
factor). Here, one dimension is used to denote the fact that the two components of efficacy, 
as theorised in the previous sections, represent one underlying construct empirically. 
Theoretically, however, as explained in the previous sections, efficacy was postulated to 
have two dimensions that work in tandem, but in the sense of components or elements: 1) 
self-reported understanding of key terms in biomedicine; 2) willingness to participate in 
public consultations. Empirically, these two components represent one underlying concept. 
A Confirmatory Factor Analysis (CFA) was also carried out on the whole sample, and the 
hypothesized one-dimension structure (based on the initial exploratory analysis) fit the data 
very well (CFI=0.99, TLI=0.98, RMSEA=0.05). The diagram showing results from this 
analysis can be found in the Appendix to this Chapter. For the purpose of the regression 
models presented here, a scale was constructed by adding up responses to all four variables, 
which presented very good internal consistency (M=6.9; SD=2.97; Cronbach’s alpha=0.72). 
Seeing that biomedical efficacy is a new construct, this study tested for measurement 
invariance across three educational groups: ‘no qualifications’ (28%), ‘CSE, GCSE, A-level 
or equivalent’ (15%), and ‘higher education or equivalent’ (57%), respectively. All efficacy 
items evidenced measurement equivalence, meaning that the items appear to work the same, 
empirically, and measure the same underlying concept, across the three educational groups.  
However, measurement invariance testing is not the focus of this Chapter. It was only carried 
out to ensure that any educational differences in efficacy that may be observed are not an 
artefact of measurement, given that the operationalisation of this concept is new. Seeing that 
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it is merely a robustness check, extensive results are not presented here. Please see Table 3.3 
in the Appendix to this chapter for model fit statistics for each type of invariance tested. 
These tests are similar to those conducted in the previous chapter, but they use a CFA 
framework. A description of all steps taken in the multi-group analyses can also be found in 
the Appendix. 
As explained above, the first three questions ask respondents to self-assess their 
comprehension of three key terms in biomedical research. All three variables were ordinal, 
ranging from ‘have not heard the term’ (1) to ‘very good’ (5). The first probes respondents 
on their knowledge of the term ‘DNA’ (the sample median was 3 for ‘some understanding’). 
The second queries them on their comprehension of the term ‘Genetically modified’ (the 
median was 1 for ‘have not heard the term’). Lastly, they were asked to rate their 
understanding of the term ‘Human Genome’ (the median was 3 for “some understanding”).  
The third question asked them to choose from the following three statements:  ‘I don’t want 
to be involved personally in public consultations on decisions about medical research’; ‘I 
would like to become actively involved in public consultations about medical research’; ‘I 
am already actively involved in public consultations on decisions about medical research’. It 
was treated as an ordinal variable with three categories, and recoded so that it followed an 
ascending order of involvement/willingness to be involved.  
In PUS, a similar measure, namely perceived knowledge, has been used in comparable 
studies examining socio-economic related gaps. In light of this, two sets of correlations were 
compared in order to assess criterion validity. Firstly, correlations were examined between a 
measure using only the self-reported knowledge items and the key concepts internal efficacy 
should be related to. The second set of correlations inspected looked at how the same key 
terms were related to the new measure of internal efficacy, and whether these patterns of 
association were stronger than those for just the perceived knowledge measure.  
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The key terms identified in political science literature are: different forms of participation 
(different to the component of efficacy; these variables were found not to be a part of the 
efficacy construct in an EFA, as explained above), factual knowledge, and interest (Clarke, 
Kornberg, and Scotto, 2008). Even though the differences between the two sets of 
associations are very small (0.03 or 0.02; please see table 3.4 in the Appendix to this 
chapter), this result is consistent across all key concepts. Therefore, it reinforces the idea that 
the concept of internal efficacy, and its new element of desire to participate in decision-
making in relation to regulating medical research, might potentially offer additional 
substantive insight into people’s engagement with biomedical research. 
Factual science knowledge was measured using ten questions. These are the same items used 
to measure science knowledge in Chapter 2.  Nine of the questions are closed-ended items 
asking respondents if a series of statements about general science, biology and genetics, are 
definitely true, probably true, probably false, definitely false, or they can say they don’t 
know. The nine statements were worded as follows: 
1) Electrons are smaller than atoms. (T) 
2) All radioactivity is man-made. (F) 
3) All plants and animals have DNA. (T) 
4) More than half of human genes are identical to those of mice. (T) 
5) The cloning of living things produces identical copies. (T) 
6) The oxygen we breathe comes from plants. (T) 
7) Lasers work by focusing sound waves. (F) 
8) By eating a genetically-modified fruit, a person’s genes could also become modified. (F) 




The tenth question tests the individuals’ comprehension of controlled experimentation. They 
are asked: ‘Suppose a drug used to treat high blood pressure is suspected of having no effect. 
On this card, there are 3 different ways scientists might use to investigate the problem. 
Which one do you think scientists would be likely to use?’ Respondents are then asked to 
select one of the following options: 1) ‘Talk to those patients that have used the drug to get 
their opinion?’ 2) ‘Use their knowledge of medicine to decide how good the drug is?’ 3) 
‘Give the drug to some patients, but not to others, and then compare the results for each 
group?’ 4) ‘Don’t know’.  
Responses to all ten items are then recoded into dummy variables with ‘1’ signifying correct 
answers, and ‘0’ for incorrect answers. ‘Don’t know’ answers are coupled with incorrect 
answers. This is informed by the sensitivity analysis conducted in Chapter 2. Responses are 
summed up to create a 0-10 scale, with high scores indicating a better understanding of 
science knowledge (M=6.4, SD=2.17, Cronbach’s Alpha= 0.63). Educational differences in 
science knowledge have been the subject of a plethora of studies since the 1970s, as 
discussed in the ‘Introduction’ and the subsequent review of literature, so there is no reason 
to suspect that it is a measurement invariance issue. Consequently, no such tests are 
performed for the science knowledge scale. 
Education and socio-demographic control measures 
Age, gender, education, and occupational status served as control measures in our analyses 
because studies have reported them as potential confounders of the relationship between 
Internet use, attention, and science knowledge (see for example Cacciatore et al., 2013). Age 
was measured as a continuous variable (M=51, SD=17). Gender was measured a 
dichotomous variable with male coded as ‘0’ and female coded ‘1’ (56% women; men are 
the reference category). Education was measured as an ordinal variable, ranging from ‘no 
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qualifications’ (coded ‘1’) to ‘higher education and above, or equivalent’ (coded as ‘5’; the 
sample median value was ‘5’). Treating education in this manner is common practice in 
knowledge gap studies (see for example Cacciatore et al., 2013 
Occupational status was measured as a three-category nominal variable, a recognised 
National Statistics Socio-economic Classification scale (NS-SEC3). The three categories 
were recoded into three dichotomous variables representing two occupational groups. The 
first dummy variable represents ‘managerial and professional occupations’ (38%). The 
second binary variable stands for ‘intermediate occupations’ (20%). According to the Office 
for National Statistics, the category of intermediate occupations from the NS-SEC 3 refers to 
clerical, sales, service, and intermediate technical occupations that do not involve planning 
or supervisory powers (ONS, 2010). The last category, ‘routine and manual occupations’ 
(41%), was left out, and represents the reference category.  Two further controls related to 
the respondents’ medical history were introduced. They are derived from a question asking 
why individuals had looked for information related to medical research online. Two dummy 
variables were created. The first was coded ‘1’ for respondents who had looked for 
information because they’d suffered from a disease and ‘0’ for those who hadn’t looked for 
information, or had looked for it for different reasons, unrelated to illness, such as ‘it was 
relevant to something I was studying’, ‘it was relevant to something I was doing at work’, ‘it 
is just an area that interests me’. The second dummy was coded the same, except ‘1’ 
represents those who had looked for information because someone in their family had 
suffered from disease. Since the purpose of introducing them was solely to test the 
robustness of our results, and they didn’t affect the results of interest (related to efficacy and 
knowledge gaps), we decided against retaining them in the final analyses. An ordinal 
measure of trust in information sources regarding medical research (combined measure of 
trust in Government, scientists working in universities, scientists working in industry, 
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medical charities) was also added initially. It was introduced as a control variable only, but it 
did not significantly alter the results and it is not of theoretical interest, so it too does not 
appear in the last version of the analysis. Please see Tables 3.6 and 3.7 in the Appendix to 
this Chapter for results including each of these additional controls. 
Internet Use and Attention 
Researchers recommend using both attention and exposure measures (see for instance 
Eveland and Scheufele, 2000). Biomedical science and its applications can be quite 
controversial with the public (i.e. vaccinations, stem cell research, etc.). Haustein et al. 
(2014) have shown that scientific articles relating to biomedical discoveries had been widely 
discussed on Twitter. The effect of that wide circulation on one of the most popular social 
media sites could potentially help reduce disparities in knowledge and efficacy. 
This study employs two measures of Internet use. The first is a dichotomous variable coded 
‘0’ for ‘other’ and ‘1’ for ‘Internet as the main source of news’ (16% of respondents rely 
primarily on the Internet for information on news and current affairs). We used responses to 
two questions to derive this variable. The first asks respondents to say what sources of news 
provide them with the most information about public affairs, giving them the option to select 
multiple sources. The second asks what is their main source of news. However, if they only 
select one source for the first question, then they are not asked the subsequent question about 
which one is their main source of news. Those respondents are treated as missing instead. 
Initially, we created a dummy variable for those missing responses to the question inquiring 
into individuals’ main source of news. We then cross-tabulated this against the first variable 
that asks them to identify one or several sources of news in order to identify the pattern of 
missing responses. This is how it emerged that those who were missing for the variable 
representing individuals’ main source of news were those who had only chosen one option at 
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the first question. We then added responses identifying the Internet as the only source of 
news from the first question with responses from the second question. We subsequently 
dichotomised the result. We also measured weekly frequency of Internet use; this was an 
ordinal variable ranging from ‘1’ ‘Don’t access the Internet’ to ‘9’ ‘13 hours or more’ (the 
sample median was ‘2’, representing ‘less than an hour’). Given the large number of 
categories, this is used as a scale in all OLS regressions. 
Attention to medical stories online is measured by asking respondents: ‘Please think of the 
last time, before this interview, that you heard, saw or read something about medical 
research that you just happened to come across and had not been trying to find. Can you 
remember what that was?’ If they say they remember, then they are presented with a list of 
possible media where they could have come across this information. Social media, e-mail, 
websites, non-science blogs, and science blogs, were all combined and recoded into one 
dummy variable coded ‘1’ for those who remembered coming across information on the 
Internet (8.2%), and ‘0’ for those who either did not remember or they had come across it on 
another medium (91.8%). Table 3.1 illustrates the distribution of all measures used in this 
study. For ordinal variables where the median was provided above, proportions are shown.  
We use R 3.2.0/RStudio 0.99.893 for our moderated ordinary least squares regression 
models with mean centering; we use Mplus 7.3 (Muthén & Muthén, 1998-2010) for the 
confirmatory factor and measurement invariance tests. In R, we use the ‘pequod’ package 
version 0.0-5 to fit our moderated regression, and to get the graphics for our two and three-
way interaction terms (Mirisola and Seta, 2016). Variables were introduced in what appeared 
to be the logical order. No claims to causality are made seeing that we are only using cross-




Table 3.1 Descriptive statistics 
 
variables as controls. It makes sense to first establish the presence of education-based gaps, 
controlling for other SES factors, before testing the impact of Internet use and attention on 
those.  Model 2 adds the Internet use and attention variables. Table 3.5 in the Appendix 
shows results from initial regressions testing the relationship between: 1) education and 
efficacy; 2) education and factual knowledge; 3) Internet use and attention, and efficacy; 4) 
Internet use and attention, and factual knowledge. Model 3 includes the three-way 
interaction terms between education, Internet use, and attention variables in order to test for 
the gap hypothesis. All continuous/ordinal variables, namely age, education, Web frequency, 
and science knowledge, have been centered at their mean. This makes the interaction effects 
independent of the main effects. Also, it changes the interpretation of the intercept, which 
now represents the change in efficacy or factual knowledge, when all other variables are held 
at their mean. 𝑅2 is used to assess how well each model fits our data.           







Science knowledge 6.4 2.17 
Age 51 17 
Education 5  
Managerial occupations 38  
Intermediate occupations 20  
Routine occupations 41  
Gender (female) 56  
Web main 
Web frequency 
                           16 
 2 
 
Attention (pays attention)  8.2  






Table 3.2 shows results from our ordinary least squares regression models predicting, in 
turn, biomedical efficacy, and factual knowledge, respectively. Tables were created using 
package ‘texreg’ (Leifeld, 2013). Graphs were created using package ‘pequod’ (Mirisola and 
Seta, 2016). Standard errors appear in brackets. 
Models 1 show results for our socio-demographic controls, predicting, in turn, biomedical 
efficacy and factual knowledge, respectively. For the efficacy model, 19% of the variance in 
efficacy can be explained by socio-demographic characteristics. For the factual knowledge 
model, 23% of the variance in objective competence is explained. There is a very small 
negative association between age and efficacy, controlling for everything in the model. 
There also seems to be a very small decrease in factual knowledge levels with age, and this 
result is statistically significant. However, given how small the association is, this result does 
not carry a lot of substantive significance. Holding everything else in Model 1 constant, 
women are less confident in their abilities to understand key terms in biomedicine and less 
willing to be actively involved in the decision-making regarding medical research. 
Moreover, women also appear to have a lower understanding of factual and experimental 
science than men.  
As expected, we find evidence that supports H1, whereby individuals who are highly 
educated feel more efficacious and are more knowledgeable than those with 
Alevels/GCSEs/Olevels or no qualification, controlling for age, gender, and occupational 
status. This indicates presence of education-based inequalities/gaps. Unsurprisingly, a 
similar pattern can be observed for individuals in managerial occupations compared to those 
doing routine and manual jobs. The former feel more efficacious and are more 
knowledgeable too, everything else held equal.   
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Models 2 present results for the model introducing the Internet use variables. The amount of 
variance in self-confidence that is explained increases by 2 percentage points with the 
addition of these variables. It only increases by 1 percentage point for the factual measure. 
Results for the demographic controls remain consistent, with very slight variations, after 
controlling for the Web as the main source of news, frequency of Web use, and whether 
individuals remember coming across information related to medical research online (which 
we call ‘attention’). Notably, the coefficient for education drops very slightly once Internet 
use and attention is taken into account. Controlling for all demographics, those whose 
primary source of news is the Internet have a higher sense of efficacy than individuals 
relying on other forms of media. However, this result is not statistically significant. 
Moreover, the same applies to factual knowledge, but this is also not statistically significant.  
The more someone uses the Internet, the more efficacious they feel, holding everything else 
constant. This result is statistically significant. The same is true for levels of factual 
knowledge. 
There is also evidence of an association between attention to medical stories online and 
biomedical efficacy. Controlling for all demographics and other Internet use variables, 
respondents who report that they remember coming across information related to medical 
research on the Web have heightened self-reported knowledge and desire to be involved in 
decision-making regarding medical research. Remembering that one has come across 
information on the Internet also has a positive impact on respondents’ levels of actual 
knowledge. As it transpires, using the Internet a great deal in general and paying some 
attention to the content has great benefits for people’s sense of efficacy regarding 
biomedicine.  
Models 3 illustrate results from the regression models introducing the two and three-way 
interaction effects between educational level, frequency of Web use, and attention to medical 
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stories online, in order to test for the gap hypothesis. Even though results for the two sets of 
interactions are presented together (for simplicity), the coefficients for the two-way 
interactions come from a model that was run separately. The model with three-way 
interactions does control for two-way interactions. 
This final model explains twenty-two percent of the variability in efficacy feelings, and 
twenty-four percentage of the volatility in objectively measured knowledge. The three-way 
interaction is only statistically significant for biomedical efficacy. However, the two-way 
interaction between education and Web frequency is statistically significant, and it offers 
insights into whether using the Internet more frequently has an impact on educational-based 
efficacy and knowledge gaps.  
Figure 3.1 portrays the two-way interaction between education and frequency of Internet use 
on biomedical efficacy. Firstly, as expected, there is a stark difference in efficacy between 
the low and high education groups. At higher levels of Internet use, those with low or no 
education gain the most in confidence, while those more highly educated only experience a 
minute gain. Thus, the education-based efficacy gap seems to diminish gradually with 
increased use of the Internet. As discussed above, both frequency of use and attention are 
important in assessing the impact of mass media on other social phenomena.   
Figure 3.2 portrays the three-way interaction between education, frequency of Internet use, 
and attention on biomedical efficacy. Firstly, as expected and as seen above, there is a clear 
difference in efficacy between the low and high education groups, independent of frequency 
of use or whether they pay attention or not.    Moreover, amongst the lowly educated, it seems 
that paying attention to medical stories online, as well as increased general use, offer rewards 
in terms of their sense of biomedical efficacy. In other words, individuals in this group 
become are more efficacious to start with;  they only get a small boost in confidence if they 
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use the Internet a great deal, provided a minimum cognitive engagement with the content. 
Those who do not pay attention at all start on a much lower level, but they experience a 
greater gain in confidence when their Internet use level augments. The gap between the 
lowly educated who pay attention and have higher confidence and those who do not pay 
attention and start with lower confidence closes significantly. This may mean that these 
individuals only need to be actively using the Internet more often to start feeling more 
confident in their abilities, and more willing to participate in the democratic process 
regarding medical research.  
 This configuration does not exactly replicate for the highly educated group. There is almost 
no difference between those with higher education who pay attention and those who do not. 
Respondents who do not pay attention to medical stories online experience a slight drop in 
efficacy at higher level of general Internet use. Highly educated individuals, who report 
having some semblance of a cognitive engagement with the content, adopt greater efficacy at 
increased levels of Internet use.  
In line with H2, the difference between the highly educated group, who do not engage with 
the content, and the lowly educated group, who do engage, is slightly reduced at high levels 
of general Internet use, holding everything else constant. Additionally, at raised levels of 
Internet use there is a significant diminution of the gap between the highly and lowly 
educated, both of which have no recollection of seeing medical stories anywhere on the 
Internet. It seems that merely using the Internet a lot, in general, is enough to augment the 
confidence and the desire to participate of those low or no education.  
The gap between the lower and higher education groups, both of which pay attention to 
online content related to medical research, widens, which is more in line with the traditional 
knowledge gap hypothesis. Curiously, however, those who are lower on education and do 
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not pay attention to medical narratives online, catch up, albeit very slightly indeed, to those 
who are highly educated and pay attention, in tune with H2. However, those in the 









           Figure 3.3 Two-way interaction : frequency of Web use and knowledge 
 
 
more educated group who pay attention still have a higher sense of efficacy concerning 
biomedicine. In conclusion, we find different scenarios of some gaps closing and another 
widening slightly, so there is mixed support for H2. 
Lastly, H3 receives support, as exhibited in Figure 3.3. Controlling for everything else in the 
model, the knowledge disparity between those who are highly educated and those who are 
not well educated dwindles at high levels of general Internet use. Interestingly, those with 
higher education experience a minor drop in factual knowledge the more they use the 
Internet. This sits in contrast to what happened with efficacy levels (which rose slightly) in 
the two-way interaction between education and frequency of Internet use. Conversely, those 
with lower levels of education, experience a significant gain in understanding of science 
when Internet use increases. Overall, it seems that the lower education group gain the most 
from using the Internet.   
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                        Table 3.2 OLS models predicting Biomedical Self-Efficacy and Science Knowledge 
___________________________________________________________________________________________________ 
                                      Biomedical self-efficacy           Science Knowledge               
 
 
                     Model 1     Model 2    Model 3    Model 1   Model 2     Model 3  
___________________________________________________________________________________________________ 
Intercept                          -0.27      -0.40 *    -0.34 *    -0.16      -0.22      -0.18     
                                   (0.15)     (0.15)     (0.16)     (0.11)     (0.11)     (0.11)    
Demographics                                                                                        
                                                                                                    
    Age                            -0.01       0.00       0.00      -0.01 ***  -0.01      -0.01     
                                   (0.00)     (0.01)     (0.01)     (0.00)     (0.00)     (0.00)    
    Female                         -0.60 ***  -0.54 ***  -0.55 ***  -0.69 ***  -0.67 ***  -0.65 *** 
                                   (0.16)     (0.16)     (0.16)     (0.11)     (0.11)     (0.11)    
    Education                       0.46 ***   0.43 ***   0.40 ***   0.36 ***   0.35 ***   0.34 *** 
                                   (0.05)     (0.05)     (0.05)     (0.04)     (0.04)     (0.04)    
    Manager                         1.44 ***   1.32 ***   1.30 ***   1.10 ***   1.05 ***   1.03 *** 
                                   (0.19)     (0.19)     (0.19)     (0.13)     (0.13)     (0.14)    
    Intermediate                    0.22       0.21       0.17       0.64 ***   0.63 ***   0.60 *** 
                                   (0.21)     (0.21)     (0.21)     (0.15)     (0.15)     (0.15)    
Internet use                                                                                        
                                                                                                    
    Web main                                   0.29       0.33                  0.15       0.16     
                                              (0.23)     (0.23)                (0.16)     (0.16)    
    Web freq.                                  0.23 **    0.19 *                0.10 *     0.08     
                                              (0.07)     (0.08)                (0.05)     (0.05)    
    Attention                                  1.15 ***   1.05 **               0.44 *     0.51     
                                              (0.29)     (0.38)                (0.21)     (0.28)    
Two-way interactions                                                                                
                                                                                                    
    Educ. X Web freq.                                    -0.04 *                          -0.06 *   
                                                         (0.04)                           (0.03)    
    Educ. X Attention                                    -0.01                            -0.27     
                                                         (0.28)                           (0.20)    
    Web freq. X Attention                                -0.25                             0.21     
                                                         (0.26)                           (0.19)    
Three-way interactions                                                                              
                                                                                                    
    Educ. X Web freq. X Attention                         0.38 *                           0.07     
                                                         (0.18)                           (0.13)    
___________________________________________________________________________________________________ 
𝑹𝟐%                                  19         21         22         23         24         24     
 




This reduction of the educational-based gap in knowledge at high levels of Internet use 
signifies that individuals in the lower education group do not just become more confident in 
their abilities; they also gain a slightly better understanding of science. Is is an encouraging 
picture and further research avenues should explore a breakdown of online activities and 
how they relate to people’s sense of efficacy as well as their knowledge of scientific facts 
and methods. Data limitations, due to the small number of observations for each type of 
activity respondents are asked about prevent us from pursuing that here. 
3.4. Conclusion 
 
In this study we embarked on an attempt to understand the impact of Internet use and 
attention to medical stories online on education-based differences in factual science 
knowledge and biomedical self-efficacy. To the authors’ knowledge at the time of writing, 
biomedical efficacy had not been measured before. A related concept of scientific 
citizenship, which combines factual knowledge and participation, was proposed by 
Mejlgaard (2009), and the Mejlgaard and Stares (2010, 2013). In their attempt to measure 
scientific citizenship, they also looked at perceived knowledge and participation. Their 
discovery that perceived knowledge is related to participation vis-à-vis policy matters 
informed the conceptualisation of efficacy. This was further informed by the political 
science literature on internal political efficacy and political information efficacy. Thus, our 
new measure was postulated to have two components: self-reported familiarity with key 
terms in biomedicine and willingness to participate in public consultations regarding the 
regulation of medical research. They were found to represent one construct, an underlying 
self-confidence with regards to biomedicine, which was termed biomedical self-efficacy.  
Perceived knowledge on its own has been widely used in PUS studies. Biomedical efficacy 
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contributes by taking into account people’s wider sense of confidence, encompassing 
participatory attitudes.  
Since the 1970s, when Tichenor et al. first proposed the Knowledge Gap Hypothesis, there 
has been a plethora of studies examining educational differences in knowledge and the mass 
media’s effect on these. However, most of these studies have been conducted in the US. The 
current study has helped further our understanding of education-based differences in 
knowledge and efficacy in a UK context. 
What is more, the democratic deficit in information has persisted, and new forms of 
information propagation have appeared. The Internet has revolutionised the way information 
is disseminated. Be that as it may, we still do not have a good grasp on how its use impacts 
upon science knowledge gaps in the UK, with the evidence on this being mixed at best. 
Lastly, there seems to be no evidence on how it affects self-confidence with regards to 
biomedicine. In order to assess Internet use in a more robust way, in line with 
recommendations in mass media effects literature, we also take into account reported 
cognitive engagement with online content regarding medical research (i.e. Eveland and 
Scheufele, 2000). Seeing that only 8.2% of our sample reported such an engagement, we 
think it is unlikely to have been severely skewed by a social desirability bias. 
Moderated ordinary least squares regressions were employed to test the following three 
hypotheses: 1) Higher education leads to a higher sense of biomedical efficacy and increased 
factual knowledge, compared to lower or no education; 2) Internet use and attention to 
medical research stories online will reduce the biomedical efficacy gap between lowly and 
highly educated individuals; 3) Internet use and attention to medical research stories will 
narrow the science knowledge gap between lowly and highly educated individuals. 
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We find evidence that lends support to the first hypothesis.  Those who are in the higher 
education group are found to be more efficacious as well as more knowledgeable. With 
regards to our second hypothesis, the results are mixed, with some gaps closing and others 
widening.  In terms of their sense of biomedical efficacy, those who have lower or no 
education and say they pay attention to medical stories online catch up to those who are 
highly educated and do not pay attention, at high levels of Internet use. The most promising 
result indicates that merely using the Internet a great deal, without saying that they pay 
attention, leads to a significant diminution of the efficacy gap between those who are highly 
educated and those who are not. On the opposite side, when both education groups say they 
pay attention, the efficacy gap between them widens when they use the Internet a lot.  
The third hypothesis received support, whereby the knowledge gap between lower and 
higher educated respondents is reduced when the former report using the Internet a great 
deal. In terms of broader socio-economic traits, women are found to be less confident and 
less knowledgeable than men. Individuals in managerial positions are much more confident 
and knowledgeable than people in routine and manual jobs. Interestingly, the associations 
between occupation and efficacy, as well as occupation and knowledge are stronger than 
those for education. This opens up a potential avenue for future research into whether mass 
media can help bridge those gaps. 
Further reflections on the theoretical and empirical contributions of this Chapter can be 





























Measurement Invariance of Biomedical Efficacy Across Three Educational Groups: a 
CFA Approach: 
 
The following steps were taken to test measurement equivalence of biomedical self-efficacy 
across three educational groups: ‘no qualifications’, ‘CSE, GCSE, A-level or equivalent’, 
and ‘higher education or equivalent’, respectively: 
1) In order to test construct/structural invariance, a 1-factor model was fitted in each 
educational group separately; model fit statistics indicated that the hypothesized one-
dimensional construct fits well in each sub-population. Thus, we can proceed to test 
for scalar invariance using multi-group models. CFI, TLI, RMSEA are used to assess 
model fit (Bartholomew, Knott, and Moustaki, 2011). 
In Chapter 2, I initially started with a fully constrained multi-group LCA model, and then 
freed parameters in turn. A Weighted Least Squares (WLSMV) estimator was used; this 
is one of the recommended estimators in the MPlus User Guide when indicators are 
categorical. WLSMV requires nested models to be compared using the DIFFTEST 
procedure. This, in turn, requires that the first model be the least restrictive model 
(Muthén & Muthén, 1998-2010). Muthén & Muthén (1998-2010) also recommend that 
measurement invariance tests for a CFA with categorical indicators be conducted in two 
steps only. This brings me to step 2 in testing for invariance: 
2) In order to test for scalar invariance, all thresholds and loadings are constrained to be 
equal across the three educational groups in a multi-group CFA model. I then 
compare this model to the less restrictive model using the DIFFTEST procedure, as 
recommended in the MPlus User Guide. DIFFTEST is a chi-square test assessing 
change in model fit when a more restrictive model is fitted; a significant p-value 
means that the restriction worsens model fit, so the less restrictive model should be 
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accepted instead (Muthén & Muthén, 1998-2010). Model fit does not worsen with 
the additional restriction (constraining thresholds and loadings to be equal across 
































































      
Construct equiv.      
No qualifications   0.99 0.99 0.09 
CSE, GCSE, A-level   0.99 0.99 0.08 
Higher education   0.99 0.99 0.08 
      
Fully unconstrained 
(baseline)  
  0.99 0.99 0.05 
      













 Self-efficacy Self-reported knowledge 
Self-Efficacy Pearson Correlation 1 .987
**
 
Sig. (2-tailed)  .000 






Sig. (2-tailed) .000  
N 1304 1360 
Trust (information sources) Pearson Correlation .024 .030 
Sig. (2-tailed) .398 .285 
N 1207 1257 





Sig. (2-tailed) .000 .000 
N 1300 1356 





Sig. (2-tailed) .000 .000 
N 1301 1356 





Sig. (2-tailed) .000 .000 
N 1303 1359 





Sig. (2-tailed) .000 .000 
N 1300 1356 





Sig. (2-tailed) .000 .000 
N 1265 1309 





Sig. (2-tailed) .000 .000 
N 1273 1324 

































               Efficacy             Knowledge 
_____________________________________________________ 
           Model1     Model2     Model3     Model4      
_____________________________________________________ 
Intercept   0.00      -0.11       0.00      -0.08     
Education   0.63 ***              0.50 ***            
Web main               0.70 **               0.49 **  
Web freq.              0.41 ***              0.28 *** 
Attention              1.63 ***              0.83*** 
_____________________________________________________ 
 𝑅2%                 14           7         16          5     
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Table 3.6 Models predicting knowledge with additional controls 
                                
                                                                     Factual Knowledge 
      
 
                                   (1)       (2)       (3)    
 
Intercept                        -0.218*  -0.243**   -0.185   
                                 (0.115)   (0.116)   (0.115)  
                                                              
Age                              -0.002    -0.003    -0.001   
                                 (0.004)   (0.004)   (0.004)  
                                                              
Female                          -0.643*** -0.616*** -0.606*** 
                                 (0.113)   (0.112)   (0.112)  
                                                              
Education                       0.320***  0.322***  0.331***  
                                 (0.038)   (0.038)   (0.038)  
                                                              
Manager                         0.971***  0.999***  0.981***  
                                 (0.136)   (0.136)   (0.136)  
                                                              
Intermediate                    0.517***  0.514***  0.517***  
                                 (0.153)   (0.153)   (0.154)  
                                                              
Web main                          0.172     0.146     0.175   
                                 (0.163)   (0.163)   (0.164)  
                                                              
Web freq.                         0.044     0.043     0.051   
                                 (0.054)   (0.054)   (0.054)  
                                                              
Attention                         0.368     0.368     0.430   
                                 (0.267)   (0.266)   (0.267)  
                                                              
Fam.disease                      0.360**                      
                                 (0.150)                      
                                                              
Resp.disease                              0.504***            
                                           (0.165)            
                                                              
Trust                                                 0.016   
                                                     (0.021)  
                                                              
Educ. X Web freq.               -0.067**  -0.067**  -0.067**  
                                 (0.028)   (0.028)   (0.028)  
                                                              
Educ. X Attention                -0.192    -0.212    -0.200   
                                 (0.195)   (0.195)   (0.196)  
                                                              
Web freq. X Attention             0.181     0.155     0.163   
                                 (0.182)   (0.181)   (0.182)  
                                                              
Educ. X Web freq. X Attention     0.069     0.089     0.071   
                                 (0.129)   (0.128)   (0.129)  
                                                              
𝑅2%                                23        23        22  
Note:*p<0.1; **p<0.05; ***p<0.01; N=1233; 
 






























                                 
                                          Efficacy  
  
          
                                   (1)       (2)       (3)    
 
Intercept                       -0.469*** -0.451*** -0.361**  
                                 (0.161)   (0.163)   (0.162)  
                                                              
Age                               0.006     0.005     0.007   
                                 (0.005)   (0.005)   (0.005)  
                                                              
Female                          -0.628*** -0.532*** -0.537*** 
                                 (0.158)   (0.158)   (0.159)  
                                                              
Education                       0.367***  0.387***  0.401***  
                                 (0.055)   (0.055)   (0.055)  
                                                              
Manager                         1.230***  1.292***  1.290***  
                                 (0.189)   (0.190)   (0.192)  
                                                              
Intermediate                      0.098     0.096     0.122   
                                 (0.215)   (0.217)   (0.218)  
                                                              
Web main                         0.387*     0.350    0.389*   
                                 (0.229)   (0.231)   (0.232)  
                                                              
Web freq.                         0.117    0.132*    0.150*   
                                 (0.077)   (0.078)   (0.078)  
                                                              
Attention                        0.817**   0.903**  0.986***  
                                 (0.359)   (0.361)   (0.362)  
                                                              
Fam.disease                      1.110***                      
                                 (0.208)                      
                                                              
Resp.disease                              0.770***            
                                           (0.231)            
                                                              
Trust                                               -0.032   
                                                    (0.031)  
                                                              
Educ. X Web freq.               -0.095**  -0.096**  -0.099**  
                                 (0.040)   (0.040)   (0.041)  
                                                              
Educ. X Attention                0.010    -0.041    -0.031   
                                 (0.267)   (0.269)   (0.270)  
                                                              
Web freq. X Attention            0.071    -0.004    -0.012   
                                 (0.244)   (0.245)   (0.247)  
                                                              
Educ. X Web freq. X Attention    0.353**   0.398**   0.391**  
                                 (0.176)   (0.177)   (0.178)  
 𝑅2%                               23        22        21   
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4. “Excuse me, doctor…” What drives people’s confidence 





 4.1.1. The doctor-patient relationship  
 
The rapport between doctors and patients has been the subject of a vast array of medical, 
philosophical, literary, and, amongst others, sociological treatises since Hippocrates. The 
manner in which doctors and their patients interact has been undergoing a deep 
transformation in the last fifty years, however, brought about by the proliferation of the 
notion of patient autonomy. This concept of patient autonomy has, in fact, occupied a central 
locus in sociology of medicine debates since the 1970s (Britten, 2001). In medical ethics, the 
moral notion of autonomy was subsumed as one of the prima facie principles meant to guide 
the doctor-patient interaction (Goold and Lipkin, 1999). In the 1980s, the World Health 
Organisation declared that patient participation in healthcare is beyond desirable, namely, it 
is a technical, social, and economic requisite (Charles, Gafni, Whelan, 1999). 
Moreover, Chin (2002) illustrates the transition of medical ethics principles inscribed in the 
American Medical Association (AMA) ethical code between 1847 and 1990. In 1847, the 
AMA titled their ethical code “Obligations of patients to their physicians”.  In 1990, this was 
drastically reformed to “Fundamental Elements of the Patient-Physician Relationship”.  The 
first describes a paternalistic model of patient-doctor interaction, while the second marks an 
important step towards a shared decision-making model of patient-doctor interaction 




In the UK, the Royal Pharmaceutical Society of Great Britain published a document in 1997, 
called ‘From compliance to concordance’, which reconceptualised the patient-doctor 
relationship as one between equals (cited in Britten, 2001).  Numerous socio-economic and 
psychosocial factors are postulated to influence individuals’ desire for involvement in the 
decisions regarding their healthcare. Studies have predominantly reported that younger age, 
female sex, higher education, being white, and less serious illness are the main drivers of a 
greater impetus to participate in medical decision-making. Be that as it may, these socio-
demographic and health influences only make up part of the story. Psychological traits, 
health literacy, self-efficacy, and trust in medics have all been identified as determinants of 
the public partaking in their healthcare (Fortune et al., 2016; Sarkar, Fisher, Schillinger, 
2006; Flynn and Smith, 2007; Ishikawa and Yano, 2008; for a meta-analysis see Benbassat 
et al., 1998).  It is of great interest to disentangle the seemingly opposite loci of impact of 
efficacy and trust, as well as any socio-economic differences in how these value 
predispositions operate. To this end, the present study uses conditional inference tree models 
to examine the roles of efficacy and trust in influencing willingness to participate in medical 
decision-making. Modelling them together and allowing a computer algorithm to split them 
according to what combinations are meaningful in predicting participation might provide 
further insight into, for instance, whether high trust and high efficacy together are similar or 
different to low trust and low efficacy. The role of long-term illness or disability, knowing 
someone in the medical profession, education, gender, ethnicity, and age is also explored. In 
the interest of a more democratic form of medicine and clinical practice, as well as a more 
comprehensive public policy, it is important to further understand the factors that affect 
citizens’ willingness to be more proactive in situations where their wellbeing is at stake. 
4.1.2. Models of patient-physician interaction  
 92 
  
But before delving into a more in-depth review of findings in relation to what makes people 
confident to participate in a clinical situation, an overview of the principle tenets of the main 
models of physician-patient interaction is deemed important. It serves to carve a theoretical 
and empirical path to the examination of individual confidence to challenge their main 
healthcare provider and, often the first port of call, the General Practitioner, as well as the 
socio-economic factors affecting it. The latter constitutes the scope of the present study.  
Prior to the 1990s, the paternalistic model was the dominant doctor-patient model of 
communication and decision-making, with the physician assuming the dominant role. The 
physician’s control over the clinical situation stemmed from knowledge, power, status, and 
sometimes gender asymmetry. The recurring motive, however, was that of doctor 
beneficence (Pellegrino, 1994).   
Charles, Gafni, and Whelan (1999) identify four main principles underlying the deference to 
medico-professional authority. The first is physicians' medical proficiency and the fact that 
they are up-to-date with clinical thinking and findings. The second belief is that they apply 
this information consistently and equally across clinical situations and patients to select the 
one best treatment available. Thus, physicians are not just the most well-informed; they 
consistently use this information to select the best course of clinical action for each of their 
patients. The third principle states that clinicians’ expertise in medical matters enables them 
to distinguish between different treatment options and select the single best course of clinical 
action for each of their patients. The fourth and last postulation states that physicians are 
invested in each decision they make, and that the patient’s best interest is accorded 
primordial importance. The latter was, in fact, legitimised through the implementation of 
codes of ethics, such as the AMA code, which bound doctors to put their patients’ best 
interests first (Charles, Gafni, Whelan, 1997).   
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It becomes apparent that in the paternalistic model, patients’ own wishes, concerns, and their 
whole persona, are left out of the decision-making process. Furthermore, individuals’ socio-
economic circumstances, attitudes, self-efficacy, how much they trust doctors, as well as 
their fears, which have been shown to affect people’s health (Guadagnoli and Ward, 1998), 
are simply ignored. New and transformative ideals regarding the inclusion of some or all of 
these factors in the patient-doctor relationship took the form of new models of 
communication and decision-making, proposed by scholars, medical professionals, and 
regulators. Two new models briefly discussed here are the shared decision-making model 
and the informed model. More specifically, both of these models are designed to remedy the 
first problem discussed, namely involving patients in the medical conversation. They give 
the patient a voice in a clinical situation by opening up a two-way dialogue. The decision is 
then either shared or left to the patient (Deber et al., 2007).   
 The shared decision-making model was proposed in order to diminish the knowledge and 
power asymmetry between patients and physicians. The physician possesses greater 
technical knowledge in most cases, and whilst that remains unchallenged, its communication 
to the patient is what becomes central to the new model. In other words, the physician should 
share their information with the patient, present treatment options, and then they reach a 
consensus on the best course of action together (Charles, Gafni, Whelan, 1999; Deber et al., 
2007; DeWalt, 2007). The informed model takes the degree of patient participation to a new 
level, being postulated as almost the reverse of the paternalistic model of medicine that 
dominated for centuries. After imparting their medical knowledge on the specifics of the 
clinical situation to the patient, as well as the treatment options available, the physician takes 
a step back and allows the patient to arrive at their own conclusions and choose the best 
treatment for themselves (Deber et al., 2007, DeWalt, 2007).    
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4.1.3. Preferences for participation and socio-economic differences 
The above alterations to the conceptualisation of the patient-physician dyad happened in the 
legal, political, sociological, and medico-regulatory realms. What patients themselves, or, 
indeed, public opinion, make of the disintegration of the paternalistic model in the Anglo-
American context might be an entirely different matter. Studies report that individuals do not 
want to have a great deal of involvement in the decisions regarding their treatments (Ahmad 
et al., 2006; Deber et al., 2007; DeWalt, 2007). The latter has made some scholars more 
reluctant to support models that were concocted as alternatives to the paternalistic model 
(Guadagnoli and Ward, 1998; Sanders et al., 2013).   
Deber et al. (2007) administered the Problem-Solving Decision-Making Scale (PSDMS) to 
subgroups of outpatients from a large teaching hospital in Ontario, Canada. PSDMS is an 
instrument designed to measure patients’ preferred role in both discussing the health issue 
and making a decision regarding the course of treatment. Patients are presented with 
different clinical scenarios, such as a general health status check, chest pain, etc. They found 
that very few desired full autonomy (i.e. only 1.2% out of over 1,000 when presented with a 
chest pain clinical scenario). Most respondents preferred to make the decision jointly with 
their doctor (65.1%), and a passive role came next (34.1%).  
 Kraetchmer et al. (2004) report similar findings from an urban teaching hospital in Canada. 
Only 1.2% out of the 606 respondents preferred a fully autonomous role in a chest pain 
scenario, 48.7% people exhibiting a preference towards shared decision-making, with a 
small majority of 50.1% preferring a passive role.  However, it is not just in potentially life-
threatening situations that individuals do not want full autonomy over the clinical situation 
or decision regarding their treatment. When presented with the current health condition 
scenario, respondents' preferences followed the same pattern as above, with very small 
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upward deviations in their preferences for autonomy. For instance, 2.9% desired full 
autonomy instead of 1.2%. Interestingly, in the current health status scenario, 67.3% of 
patients desired shared decision making, and only 29.6% wanted a passive role. It seems that 
in more serious situations, these patients were more willing to defer to a medical authority, 
whereas in a non-threatening general check-up scenario, they claimed some of the authority 
back.   Vertinsky (1974) and Haug and Lavin (1981) (both cited in Guadagnoli and Ward, 
1998) report similar findings on small samples of healthy respondents. 
In the UK, Robinson and Thomson (2001) conduct focus groups and report that individuals 
may not understand the importance of being more involved in their healthcare decisions. 
Moreover, they make an argument for amplified information transmission from physicians to 
their patients, which would lead to more confidence to partake. The realisation of the 
importance of their participation would be actualised post factum. Numerous other studies in 
medical sociology, medicine, and public health literature have reported findings following a 
similar pattern (see for example Arora and McHorney, 2000; Benbassat et al., 1998; Charles, 
Gafni, Whelan, 1999;  Deber et al., 2007; DeWalt, 2007; Fortune Shotwell, Buccelato, and 
Moran, 2016,).   
This study sets out to overcome some of the limitations of the findings discussed. These 
limitations include some methodological issues, such as small and unrepresentative samples 
often sourced from quite specific populations (for example patients in a certain clinic), 
mostly urban settings in the US and Canada. There were only a handful of studies identified 
that are based on a representative sample. Levinson, Kao, Kuby, and Thisted (2005) used the 
General Social Survey and found that nearly all respondents preferred to be asked their 
opinion and to be offered choices. About half wanted to leave the final decision to their 
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physicians, and 44% preferred to receive information from doctors rather than looking for it 
themselves. 
4.1.4. Efficacy, Trust, and Participation in medical decision-making   
Socio-economic factors do not paint the full picture of what motivates, or indeed deters, 
people from actively partaking in decisions regarding their health (Benbassat et al., 1998). 
Beyond socio-economic influences, there are important psychosocial mechanisms 
underpinning attitudes towards taking part in healthcare decision processes. Amongst these, 
self-efficacy and trust in doctors as information sources are of central interest in the present 
study. Seeing as participatory ideas have an element of underlying confidence, self-efficacy 
in reference to biomedical science and research seems particularly relevant when attempting 
to explain predilections towards medical decision-making. Self-efficacy has the potential to 
determine the amount of effort individuals will put into an activity/behaviour as well as their 
persistence in the face of hurdles and stressful situations (Bandura, 1977; Pellegrino, 1994).  
Multiple past studies have found that people who feel more efficacious have more 
favourable attitudes towards partaking in medical decision-making as well as augmented 
participation rates (Stretcher, McEnvoy, Becker, and Rosenstock, 1986; Janz et al., 2004; 
Belcher et al., 2005). The mechanism postulated is in line with Bandura’s conceptualisation 
of efficacy, namely that increased feelings of confidence in one’s competence lead to greater 
effort put into certain activities and behaviours. Moreover, the political science concept of 
internal efficacy is what the construct of biomedical self-efficacy has been based on in this 
PhD thesis (see for example Craig, Niemi, Silver, 1990; Morrell, 2003; Niemi, Craig, Mattei, 
1991; Kaid, McKinney, Tedesco, 2007). Going further than self-reported familiarity with 
biomedical terms (referred to as self-reported knowledge in the Public Understanding of 
Science literature), in this chapter efficacy also englobes a participatory aspect, namely 
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confidence to discuss science heard or seen on the news. This is similar to some of the 
participatory questions used by Mejlgaard and Stares (2010) to measure scientific 
citizenship. 
Initially, public participation in medical decision-making was also modelled as a component 
of efficacy, in an attempt to simulate the efficacy measure used in Chapter 3. However, a 
Confirmatory Factor Analysis model revealed that participation in healthcare decisions does 
not cohere well with the measures of self-reported knowledge, or those of the usefulness and 
application of science, even though they are correlated. This may be because it does not ask 
respondents to relate to medicine as an entity, as the participation component used in 
Chapter 3 did. Seeing as the self-reported familiarity questions also refer to biomedicine as 
an entity (as opposed to a personal experience of it – i.e. having stem cells collected), 
relating them to a question about a potential personal clinical experience seems to not work. 
Willingness to take part in public consultations regarding medical research may have worked 
well with the self-assessment questions in Chapter 3 because individuals are asked to rapport 
their confidence to bigger issues, which is more similar to internal political efficacy. A 
clinical scenario may trigger different thought and emotional processes, where respondents 
can use their sense of efficacy about biomedicine and science in general to inform their 
behaviour. Thus, conceptually and empirically, participation in healthcare decisions 
represents a different construct. Ergo, it makes sense to study the impact of biomedical 
efficacy on this type of participation.  
All in all, one of the aims of this paper is to study the relationship between confidence in 
one’s own abilities and potential behaviour during clinical practice. Confidence about 
knowing the meaning of a biomedical term, confidence to discuss science heard on the news, 
and reporting to find it useful in everyday situations, might or might not translate into 
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confidence in a clinical practice situation where the person’s health might be at stake, 
hypothetical though it may be.  
Moreover, a related concept, namely health literacy, has also been discovered to be 
positively related to increased participation rates (Ishikawa and Yano, 2008). Using the 
Wisconsin Longitudinal Graduate survey, a population-based cohort of older adults aged 63 
– 66, Flynn and Smith (2007) investigate the relationship between personality traits, which 
are related to self-efficacy (Bandura, 1977), and a preference for participation in medical 
decisions. Openness to experience, decreased neuroticism and agreeableness were related to 
preferences for a more active decision-making style. These psychological traits are not 
measured here. However, any findings regarding high levels of confidence to participate 
would also tell us a little about their underlying psychological characteristics.  
Returning to biomedical self-efficacy, the mechanisms relating efficacy to participation 
identified in the literature review are also expected to be at work here. The first hypothesis 
thus becomes: 
H1: People with higher levels of biomedical self-efficacy will show more willingness to 
participate in medical decision-making. 
The other potential psychosocial influence explored here is trust in medics and other 
healthcare professionals as information sources.  The issue of who the public place their trust 
in for information regarding their healthcare is crucial in a society that sees fast-advancing 
technologies and medical therapies (Anderson et al., 2012, 2008). The dynamic of the 
relationship between trust and participatory ideas is conceptually and empirically distinct to 
that connecting efficacy to participation. Unlike confidence in one’s own abilities, which 
prompts a higher desire for participation, trust in doctors has been found to work more in a 
 99 
  
similar vein to deference to scientific authority. Given the breadth of medical knowledge, 
most citizens don’t have the time to keep up with the latest developments. Therefore, when 
making decisions about their healthcare they rely on cognitive shortcuts such as trust. Higher 
levels of trust appear to be forged by the older and more highly educated citizens deferring 
more to scientists/specialists (Brossard and Nisbet, 2006).  
The principles underlying deference to scientific authority are in line with the cognitive 
miser theory, whereby citizens face a choice of who to trust rather than formulating well-
informed opinions regarding the benefits and risks of certain scientific technologies, or 
courses of treatment in this case (Anderson et al., 2012). The main tenet of deference to 
scientific authority is that the scientific establishment has already determined what is right or 
wrong and non-scientists should not form their own views regarding scientific controversies  
(Brossard and Nisbet, 2006; Anderson et al., 2012;). Anderson et al. (2012) postulate that the 
main dissimilarity of deference from trust is its stability and longevity, trust being subject to 
change. Stability and longevity resonate with the paternalistic model of patient-physician 
interaction, which was prevalent for decades. Because of its longevity, paternalistic clinical 
practice is bound to have institutionalised a culture of deference to doctors in terms of 
medical decisions. This is probably especially true amongst the socio-demographic groups 
identified as wanting to be less involved, given their lower socio-economic characteristics 
and the power dynamic in a clinical scenario. The tide has only recently started to change 
and public levels of willingness to partake in decisions concerning their health are still low.  
Finally, trust in doctors as information sources here is posited to be quite similar to deference 
to scientific authority.  Findings in the health literature also suggest that, in general, trust in 
doctors and trust in doctors as information sources operates in a similar way to deference. In 
other words, individuals who tend to exhibit higher trust levels want to be less involved in 
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the decision-making regarding their healthcare, and have higher adherence to treatment 
plans. It could thus be argued that they defer to their physicians (Pearson and Raeke, 2000; 
Belcher, 2005; Hesse et al., 2005; Trachtenberg, Duga, and Hall, 2005; DeWalt, 2007; 
Fortune et al., 2016).  
This leads to the second hypothesis: 
H2: People with higher levels of trust in doctors as information sources will show less 
willingness to participate in medical decision-making.  
In terms of socio-demographic differences, studies have shown younger age, female sex, 
higher education, being white, and less serious illness to be related to more positive attitudes 
towards participation in healthcare decisions (Trachtenberg, Dugan, Hall, 2005; Fortune et 
al., 2016). Chronic conditions seem to influence preferences differently to the acute medical 
scenarios discussed in the literature review. The author is not aware of a similar population-
based study in the UK examining socio-economic differences in participation preferences. 
One of the benefits of the current study is that it is based on a representative sample of the 
UK population, which can potentially offer insight into preferences of the public at large, 
rather than just specific patient groups. It can thus help shed light on broader population 
patterns in preferences for participation in medical decision-making, and potentially provide 
some evidence for policy makers.  Given the scarcity of population-based studies, and the 
somewhat mixed results of the impact of socio-economic factors, this analysis can be 
regarded as an exercise in both prediction and classification of preferences for participation. 
Thus, I pose the following research question: 
RQ1: What are the interrelationships amongst efficacy, trust, and socio-economic factors 







In order to test these hypotheses, conditional inference tree models were fitted using the 
adult sample from Wave III of the Wellcome Trust Monitor Survey. The Wellcome Trust 
Monitor is a triennial survey of adults and young people based on a representative 
probability sample of the UK population. The main areas covered are interest in, knowledge 
of, and attitudes to medical research, with a focus on biomedicine. Wellcome Monitor III 
took place in 2015, and interviews were conducted with 1,524 adults (aged 18+). The 
response rate for Monitor III was 51.4% for the adult sample (Huskinson et al., 2016). 
4.2.2. Measures 
 
The outcome variable, willingness/confidence to participate in medical decision-
making/challenge GPs, was measured with a single item. Respondents were given the 
following scenario and then were asked to say how much the person in the scenario was, or 
was not, like them: ‘When he sees a medical professional, he likes to ask questions to make 
sure the medical professional hasn’t made a mistake or missed something, and feels 
confident querying or challenging the medical professional’s conclusions. How much is this 
person like you?’.  The response options were as follows: 1. Very much like me; 2.  Like me; 
3. Somewhat like me; 4. A little like me; 5. Not at all like me; 6. SPONTANEOUS: Can’t 
say/ it depends. The last option was dropped as it bears no substantive meaning for these 
analyses. The variable was recoded as a new ordered variable with the following categories: 
1. Very much like me; 2. Like/Somewhat like me; 3. A little/not at all like me. It was treated 
as an ordered factor in R. As a note: willingness to participate/participation/confidence to 
challenge GPs or to participate are used interchangeably throughout this chapter. 
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The biomedical self-efficacy construct was measured by combining responses to five 
questions. Two of the questions ask respondents to assess their understanding of two key 
terms in biomedical research, namely ‘Genetically Modified’ and ‘Antibiotic Resistance’. 
The options presented to them are: 1. Very good; 2. Good; 3. Some understanding; 4. Have 
heard the term but have little understanding of what it means; and 5. Have not heard the 
term.  These were reverse coded so that: ‘Have not heard to term’ became ‘0’; ‘Have heard 
the term but have little understanding of what it means’ was coded as ‘1’; ‘Some 
understanding’ was recoded to ‘2’; ‘Good’ became ‘3’; and ‘Very good’ was recoded to ‘4’. 
The resulting summated scale ranged from 2 to 21. It was recoded to range from 0 to 19. 
The next two questions tap into a more general self-reported understanding of science news 
stories and confidence to discuss these. The first asks: ‘Thinking of the stories about science 
you see or hear in the news, which of the statements on this card would you say best 
describes you?’. Respondents are then presented with four options: 1. I usually understand 
what they are talking about; 2. I sometimes understand what they are talking about; 3. I 
usually do not understand what they are talking about; 4. (SPONTANEOUS: I don’t see or 
hear science new stories). The fourth option was dropped from these analyses as it doesn’t 
say anything about their confidence regarding their level of understanding; it seems to 
simply suggest that they may not have heard anything related to science in the news, or may 
not be willing to cognitively engage enough to remember. This decision was further 
motivated by the fact that there were only 21 individuals who answered in this way. 
Response options 1 through 3 were reverse coded from negative to positive so that ‘3’ 
became ‘0’, ‘2’ became’ ‘1’, and ‘1’ became ‘2’. This question is then followed by: ‘And in 
general, how confident would you say you feel discussing these news stories about science 
with other people?’.  Participants were then asked to choose from the following options: 1. 
Very confident; 2. Confident; 3. Not very confident. 4. Not at all confident. Answers were 
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again reverse coded so that ‘4’ became ‘0’, ‘3’ became ‘1’, ‘2’ remained ‘2’, and ‘1’ became 
‘3’. The last question taps into respondents’ subjective assessments of the usefulness of 
science in their everyday lives. They then have to choose from the following options: 1. 
Very useful. 2. Fairly useful. 3. Not very useful. 4. Not at all useful. 5. I don’t know enough 
about science for it to be useful. Again, the scale was reverse coded to follow a negative to 
positive pattern. Option ‘5’ was recoded to ‘0’, ‘4’ to ‘1’, ‘3’ to ‘2’, ‘2’ to’1’, and ‘1’ to ‘4’.  
Initially, an exploratory correlation matrix was run in order to explore the degree of 
relatedness amongst these variables, which ranged from 0.25 to 0.58. Other variables asking 
about confidence to use their knowledge to inform aspects of their lives, such as making a 
decision to make an appointment to see a doctor, were initially included, but the correlations 
with the other variables were too weak. A further Confirmatory Factor Analysis treating the 
final selected variables as ordinal measures was conducted, and the hypothesized one factor 
structure fit the data well (CFI= 0.98; TLI= 0.97; RMSEA=0.04). Results from two CFA 
analyses are presented in the Appendix. The first considers the possibility that willingness to 
participate in healthcare decisions is part of efficacy. However, this item does not load on the 
efficacy factor. The second CFA analysis yields a one-factor solution for the remaining five 
questions described above. For parsimony, a summated scale was built by simply adding 
answers to all five questions, which demonstrated strong internal consistency (Cronbanch’s 
alpha= 0.81). This is used in all subsequent analyses. 
Trust in doctors as information sources were measured with a single 5-point item. 
Respondents were asked to rate their trust in five science actors to provide ‘accurate and 
reliable information about medical research.’ The first of the series of five actors were 
‘doctors, nurses, and other medical practitioners’. Respondents then had to say whether they 
had: 1. Complete trust; 2. A great deal of trust; 3. Some trust; 4. Very little trust; 5. No trust 
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at all. The scale was reversed to range from ‘1’, for ‘No trust at all’, to ‘5’, for ‘Complete 
trust’. The variable was treated as an ordered factor in R. 
In line with findings outlined in the previous section, gender, age, education, ethnicity, 
knowing a medical professional, and having a disability or long-term illness were introduced 
as control measures. Gender was used as a binary variable. Ethnicity was used as a dummy 
variable representing white and non-white individuals (whites are the reference category). 
Age was recoded from a continuous variable ranging from 18 to 96 to three binary variables 
representing three age categories, namely a young group aged 18 to 34, a middle-aged group 
aged 35 to 54, and an older group aged over 55, respectively. In addition, a dummy variable 
denoting whether respondents know or do not know a medical professional was also 
included in the model. The rationale for this is that individuals might be more comfortable 
asserting themselves in front of doctors if they at least know someone in that profession.  
Education was measured with three dummy variables coded from a variable which measures 
respondents’ highest educational qualification. The initial categories were: 1. Postgraduate 
degree; 2. First degree; 3. Higher education below degree; 4. A levels/ GCSEs/O levels; 5. 
Level 1 qualifications; 6. No qualifications. The first three categories were collapsed to form 
a new dummy variable representing those who had gone into higher education. Category 4 
became a dummy variable. Categories 5 and 6 were collapsed and recoded into a binary 
variable. ‘Higher education’ was used as the reference category.  
In order to measure the presence of a disability or long-term illness, respondents were asked 
the following question: ‘Do you yourself or someone close to you, have a serious long term 
illness or medical condition? Please include any conditions which have lasted or are likely 
to last at least 12 months and which, without treatment, would limit one's ability to carry out 
normal day-to day activities.’ The response options were: 1. Yes, respondent; 2. Yes, family  
 105 
  
Table 4.1 Descriptive statistics 
 
member; 3. Yes, close friend; 4. No, no one. A dummy variable was created. It was coded 
‘1’ for those who mentioned having a disability or long-term illness themselves, and ‘0’ if 
they mentioned any of the other three options, namely close family, friends, or no one. I have 
not been able to find any studies that examine a potential link between a family member, or 
friend, being ill and desire for involvement in decisions about one’s own health. One of the 








Participation/confidence to challenge medical professional: 
 
Very much like me (v) 30  
Like/Somewhat like me (l/s) 42  
A little/Not at all like me (li/n) 28  
 




1.No trust at all 2 
 2.Very little trust 5  
3.Some trust 30  
4.A great deal of trust 43  
5.Complete trust 20  
 
Age dummies:  
 
18-34 years old 24  
35-54 years old 33  




Degree+  40  
A level/ GCSE/O level 35  
Level 1/ no qualifications 25  
 
Gender (male) 44 
 Has disability/long-term illness 24 





between individual socio-economic characteristics and participation in medical decision-
making, which has thus far only been investigated using small patient groups from hospitals 
or clinics. Therefore, individual disability or illness, which has been examined in those 
studies, is of central interest.  
Distribution frequencies of all variables used in the regression analyses are shown in Table 
4.1. Means are given for continuous measures and percentages represent the proportion of 
respondents who fall into each category. Plots showing bivariate relationships between each 
explanatory variable and the outcome are shown in the Appendix to this Chapter. 
4.2.3. Analytical Strategy 
 
 All data management and data analysis were carried out in R 3.3.2/ RStudio 1.0.44. 
Conditional inference trees modelling participation as an ordinal variable were fitted to the 
data. First, ordered logistic regression was attempted, but the proportional odds assumptions 
did not hold. A conditional inference tree is a data mining technique, nonparametric and 
algorithmic in nature, which uses binary recursive partitioning to model regressions of a set 
of covariates on the outcome of interest. It can estimate an ordinal regression tree without the 
proportional odds assumption. Unlike the mixed logit models shown in the Appendix, it also 
retains the ordinal nature of the outcome variable. The algorithm tests if any covariates are 
associated with the given outcome, and picks the variable that has the strongest association 
with it. It then makes a binary split in this predictor, dividing the dataset into two or more 
subsets, depending on the measurement level. The algorithm is recursive because the first 
two steps are repeated for each subset until there are no variables that are associated with the 
outcome at the pre-defined level of statistical significance (I have chosen 0.05 as the cut-off). 
The results can be visualized as a tree structure with binary splits forming ‘branches’ and 
‘leaves’. Respondents are assigned to ‘nodes’, or classes, based on the subsets they fall into 
 107 
  
during the final split, at the end of the recursive partitioning process. The algorithm uses 
permutation to perform the partitioning, which is similar to bootstrapping. It draws random 
samples from the subsets in order to perform the significance level tests (Hothorn et al, 
2006a; Hothorn, Hornik and Zeileis, 2006b; Hothorn and Zeileis, 2015). 
Packages ‘party’ and ‘partykit’ are the only packages that can implement ordinal conditional 
inference trees in R (Hothorn, Hornik and Zeileis, 2006b; Hothorn and Zeileis, 2015). 
Conditional inference trees are also more robust than traditional decision/regression trees as 
they deal with the problem of overfitting and use significance level tests instead of 
information measures. Random forests of individual trees can also be fitted, and they work 
by extracting a user-specified number of trees through resampling strategies. Variable 
importance measures can then be used to assess each covariate’s contribution. For ordinal 
outcomes they measure by how much the probability of a given response would decrease if a 
certain covariate was to be left out of the analysis (Hothorn et al., 2006a). Random forests of 
multiple conditional inference trees were also estimated. Two thousand random trees were 
estimated. Random forests can improve the prediction accuracy compared to estimating a 
single tree, but are currently somewhat experimental in nature, and thus are not fully 
understood. Therefore, a random forest is only estimated to check if it improves the 
prediction accuracy and to check the importance of each variable in the model (Hothorn et 
al., 2006a). Model fit statistics were obtained using package ‘caret’ (Kuhn, 2008).  
 4.3. Results  
 
 
The tree plot in figure 4.1 below illustrates the relationships between the covariates and the 
classification of individuals into nodes, based on their characteristics and probabilities of 
responding a certain way. The circles represent internal nodes, and at the bottom of the tree 
there are terminal nodes. The latter show a final classification of individuals based on the 
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paths amongst the internal nodes and their final probabilities of response to the outcome 
variable. Nodes are also referred to as classes. ‘Node’ and ‘class’ shall be used 
interchangeably from this point forth. The height of the bars in the terminal classes 
corresponds to the probability of response to the outcome variable, participation. The 
categories were relabelled so that the names could be easily read on the tree plot. 
‘Like/somewhat like me’ became ‘l/s’; ‘A little/ not at all like me’ became ‘li/n’; ‘Very 
much like me’ became ‘v’. The tree had a moderate prediction accuracy of 49% and a fair 
inter-rater agreement (kappa=0.21; this is similar to a correlation coefficient and it ranges 
from ‘0’ to ‘1’) (Landis and Koch, 1975), These fit statistics tell us how well the predictors 
work together, and how helpful these categories, that people are assigned to based on the 
most meaningful combinations of their characteristics that can be related to the outcome, are 
in predicting attitudes to participation. The prediction accuracy for the random forest with 
2000 random trees was not better than this. Prediction rates and kappa coefficients were 
obtained by comparing predicted to true/observed values following the recommended 
procedure in the ‘party’ package vignette (Hothorn et al., 2006a).    
From figure 4.1 it emerges that there are eight terminal nodes containing respondents with 
various characteristics, that are represented in the inner nodes. These nodes are arrived at by 
following the interrelationships illustrated by the branches (paths) that go from internal node 
to internal node. The classes vary in sizes somewhat, although in general the differences are 
not great. Individuals in class 5 have the highest probability of not wanting to be involved in 
decisions made by their GPs. This class is very small, however, comprising of only 13 
people. The largest class found, namely class 6 (n=336) is next in terms of it being 
composed of respondents who have little or no confidence to take part in the medical 
decision-making process. Individuals in class 13 (n=169) show more favourability towards 
being involved, having the highest proclivity to say it is like or somewhat like them to 
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challenge and query a GP’s decisions. The most active and confident of respondents fall into 
class 15 (n=270).  
In a way, the splits can also be regarded as similar to interacting variables. The tree plot 
reveals the different combinations of efficacy, trust, and socio-economic factors that are 
significant in understanding preferences for, and confidence to participate in, medical 
decision-making. Understanding these interrelationships helps answer RQ1.Respondents in 
node 1 who score 11 or lower on efficacy, and who know medical professionals, fall into 
terminal node 3. This latter class is characterised by higher probabilities of saying that 
querying a GP is ‘like or somewhat like’ them, followed by a ‘little or not at all like’ them, 
with ‘very much like’ them coming last. The path from node 2 to node 4 is characterised by 
not knowing medical professionals. Respondents who do not know medical professionals, 
and score 3 or lower, out of 19, on the efficacy scale, are finally allocated to node 5 which 
only has respondents who have low confidence to participate in decisions regarding their 
health. If, however, respondents in node 4 score over 3 on efficacy, they are allocated to 
node 6. The latter class is also defined by higher probabilities of low confidence to 
participate, and has a gradient in confidence, with slightly fewer respondents having medium 
confidence to participate, and even fewer exhibiting high confidence.  
We can observe more interactions by following the paths amongst nodes 1, 7, 8, 10, 12 to 
terminal nodes 9, 11, 13, 14, and 15. Following the path from node 1 to node 7 are 
respondents scoring above 11 on the efficacy scale. Node 7 then splits respondents between 
those that fall above 15 on the efficacy scale, and those that fall at or below 15, respectively. 
The first split then follows a path to class 8, representing trust. As a reminder, trust 
categories represent the following levels: 1. No trust at all; 2. Very little trust; 3. Some trust; 
4. A great deal of trust; 5. Complete trust. They appear as numbers on the graph due to 
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readability issues (the words are too large to appear on the graph). It is treated as an ordinal 
variable in R. 
If individuals have either no trust or some trust in doctors and other medical practitioners, 
they are split further and allotted to terminal node 9. This class is characterised by a 
probability of being very confident in querying GP diagnoses that is only very slightly 
higher than moderate confidence (saying ‘like/ somewhat like me’). Individuals allocated to 
this final class have significantly lower probabilities of saying it is only a ‘little or not at all 
like’ them to challenge GPs decisions regarding their healthcare. 
Thus, an absence of trust in doctors or only having some trust leads to respondents not 
deferring to them for medical decisions, which is in consonance with previous findings and 
provides evidence to support the second hypothesis. Oddly, some trust appears to work the 
same as no trust, and very little trust is grouped with high levels of trust. A potential 
explanation is that those who respond that they have some trust are more cognitively 
disengaged than those who say they have no trust at all. The other potential explanation is 
that those with very little trust at node 8 they are further split at node 10 into those who have 
a long-term illness and end up in terminal class 11, which is similar to class 9 in relation to 
participatory attitudes. This, however, cannot be checked with this model. 
Going back to node 8 representing the split for trust, individuals who say they have very 
little trust, a great deal of trust, or complete trust are further split at node 10 into those who 
have a long-term illness or disability and those who do not. The first are then allocated to 
final class 11 who are most likely to say it is like or somewhat like them to query their 
General Practitioner. This is followed by a slightly lower probability of saying it is ‘very 




The second split for node 10 represents those who do not have a long-term illness or 
disability, and who are allocated to node 12, where a further split is made based on gender. 
Thus, those who do not have a long-term illness and who are male are allocated to final class 
13. The latter is characterised by high probabilities of saying it is only ‘like or somewhat 
like’ them to query GPs. There also seems to be a stepwise decrease in probability, with 
individuals in this class having the lowest probability of being highly confident, compared to 
the other two levels of confidence. However, overall, this still have higher probabilities of 
medium willingness to participate. 
Returning to node 12 representing gender, the path for women sees them apportioned to 
terminal node 14, also defined by a higher probability of being confident or somewhat  
confident to participate in medical decision-making. This is lower than for men in class 13. 
The probabilities of either having no confidence or very much confidence appear equal. A 
relatively high level of efficacy (12-15 out of 19), little or great levels of trust, no long-term 
disability, and being male leads to a greater chance of having low or medium confidence to 
challenge medics, rather than high confidence. Compared to men, women with the same 
characteristics have higher probabilities of being very confident, in line with other findings. 
To understand class 15 the path back to node 7 needs to be followed. The second split from 
node 7 is based on respondents scoring over 15 on the efficacy scale, who are then assigned 
to node 15. It seems that individuals who are very self-efficacious with regards to their 
knowledge of biomedicine also have the highest probability of being very confident in 




Figure 4.1 Conditional inference tree predicting participation 
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Overall, class 15 is the most self-efficacious and has the highest propensity to be willing to 
partake in the medical decision-making process. Thus, with this sort of confidence and self-
efficacy, an argument can be made that this class might possess a favourable predisposition 
towards an informed decision-making model. 
Figure 4.2 shows the importance of each variable included in the random forest model. Tree 
plots from random forests cannot be plotted, but they are used to assess the change in the 
probability of the outcome if an individual predictor were removed from the analysis (seen 
on the x axis).  
Efficacy seems to be the main driver of participatory attitudes. Age, knowing a medical 
professional, gender, trust, and education seem to have a similar influence in predicting 
participatory attitudes. 





Age and education were not statistically significant, however, therefore they do not appear in 
the tree plot. Having a long-standing illness of disability and ethnicity have a similar impact 




So far, most studies investigating public willingness and confidence to participate in medical 
decision-making have been conducted on small unrepresentative samples. Moreover, most of 
these studies have been carried out in the US and Canada. Very few have attempted to delve 
into the complexities of British public attitudes towards their involvement in the process of 
making medical decisions, or how this fits in with the greater debates regarding patient-
physician interactions. The present study addresses the latter and it uses a representative 
sample of the UK population, thus overcoming a lot of the shortcomings of most past 
studies. Understanding which, if any, patient-physician interaction model the British public 
might show preference for is a very important step in potentially informing the remodelling 
of the healthcare system in the UK into a more democratic establishment. 
Two hypotheses and a research question were posed. The first hypothesis posited that higher 
self-efficacy is linked to higher willingness and self-assurance to question a physician’s 
decision. The second hypothesis advanced that higher deference to medical authority, in the 
form of a high level of trust in doctors, nurses, and other medical practitioners as information 
sources, leads to lower willingness to participate. The research question investigates the 
interrelationships of socio-economic factors, efficacy, trust, and participation willingness. 
All findings discussed below answer this research question.  
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A conditional inference tree was fitted in R using package ‘party’, which estimates an 
ordinal regression tree without imposing the restrictive proportional odds assumption, which 
is a feature of the traditional technique (Hothorn, Hornik and Zeileis, 2006b). 
 A total of eight final groups categorising individuals based on the combinations of the 
predictors were found. Overall, most of the groups have moderate desire and confidence to 
participate in medical decisions, with most classes having higher probabilities of saying it is 
‘like or somewhat like’ them to question a GP’s decisions. The individuals in the class who 
have the highest probability of saying it is ‘somewhat like’ them or ‘like’ them to be active 
in a clinical scenario are male, have either little trust or a lot of trust, have no long-term 
illness or disability, and are very confident in their abilities to understand and discuss 
biomedicine and science. Thus, there is evidence to support the first hypothesis seeing that 
higher self-efficacy is associated with higher propensities towards more active involvement 
on the respondents’ part. The second hypothesis also receives partial support in that some of 
these individuals who are highly willing and confident to participate have little trust in 
doctors. This reinforces findings from past studies (Pearson and Raeke, 2000; Belcher, 2005; 
Hesse et al., 2005; Trachtenberg et al., 2005; DeWalt, 2007; Fortune et al., 2016).  
The group who seem to be the least disposed to participate (who have the highest probability 
of not wanting to be involved out of all the groups) have very low self-efficacy and do not 
know medical professionals personally. However, there are only thirteen individuals in this 
group, so it is hard to make any further inferences about them. The largest class found is also 
the class that is characterised by the next highest propensity to have little or no confidence to 
take part in decisions regarding their health. They are also not self-efficacious when it comes 
to their knowledge of biomedicine. Thus, it could be argued that these respondents would 
adhere more to the paternalistic model of patient-doctor contact. Two groups of individuals 
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showed higher chances of very high confidence to be involved. The first only exhibits a 
marginally higher likelihood of a high degree of confidence, is very self-efficacious, and 
does not defer to medical authority. The second has extremely high levels of self-efficacy 
and an even higher probability of participation. This, again, is in line with other findings 
from past studies, and it may indicate tendencies towards a preference for an informed model 
(Stretcher, McEnvoy, Becker, Rosenstock, 1986; Janz et al., 2004; Belcher et al., 2005).  





































































































A Mixed Logit Analysis:  
A somewhat different version of this analysis was also expressed as mixed logit models for 
the same reasons conditional inference trees were estimated. First, ordered logistic 
regression was attempted, but the proportional odds assumptions did not hold. Multinomial 
logistic regression was considered next, but the independence of irrelevant alternatives (IIA) 
assumption seemed neither plausible in this case, nor did it succeed to pass the Hausman 
MacFadden test. The mixed logit model relaxes the IIA assumption and allows for random 
parameters to be introduced, thus allowing estimates to vary from individual to individual. 
This is in contrast to multinomial logit models, where they are fixed. Coefficients are 
considered random variables, and random numbers are drawn from their joint conditional 
distribution. The unconditional probability is then calculated as the average of the 
conditional probabilities. Because the probabilities are integrals that have closed form, the 
estimation of mixed logit models is done by simulation. Halton sequence numbers have been 
found to be the most efficient, and are employed in these models (McFadden and Train, 
2000; Croissant, 2013). Models were run with 500 and 1000 random draws, on two different 
seeds, namely 20 and 40. Results were almost identical, so the coefficients presented below 
are from the models run with 500 random draws, seed 20. ‘Like/very much like me’ was 
chosen as the reference category because it is the largest category. Random intercepts for ‘a 
little/not at all like me’ and ‘somewhat like me’ were modelled initially to test whether there 
was evidence of individual heterogeneity in preferences for participation. The distribution of 
these random parameters was first specified as normal and then lognormal. However, in both 
cases, the standard deviations for the two parameters were not statistically significant from 0, 
therefore, they were then removed from the model. All other parameters remained the same 
after the removal of the random intercepts. The simulations were carried on as explained 
above. Interactions with educational variables were attempted in these models. Variables 
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were introduced in what appeared to be the logical causal order. The outcome variable was 
recoded as follows: ‘like me’ and ‘very much like me’ were collapsed into a category; the 
middle option ‘somewhat like me’ was retained; ‘a little like me’ and ‘not at all like me’ 
were collapsed. No claims to causality are made seeing that these models use cross-sectional 
data to only test for associational relationships. Tables were created using package 
‘stargazer’ (Marek, 2015). 
Trust and efficacy were modelled separately as these models have slightly different 
hypotheses. Additional hypotheses:  
H3: Having low education, will negatively moderate the impact of efficacy on participation 
willingness. 
H4: Higher education will positively moderate the impact of trust on participation 
willingness. 
Models 1 show results for efficacy and trust, respectively. Models 2 add socio-
demographics. Models 3 include the interaction terms between science training and the 
efficacy and trust variables, respectively. Models 4 present results for the two-way 
interactions between highest educational qualification and efficacy and trust, respectively. 
Figure 4.3 illustrates the significant interactions between efficacy and science training. 




Table 4.2 Mixed logit- efficacy models 
                                                                            
Dependent variable: 
 










(4)          
A little/Not at all:Intercept 9.063*** 5.107*** 3.210*** 6.100***       
Somewhat:Intercept 1.693*** 1.637***            0.789 2.843***       
A little/Not at all:Efficacy 0.790*** 0.799*** 0.834*** 0.789***       
Somewhat:Efficacy 0.899***   0.891***   0.952***   0.854***       
A little/Not at all:Male  1.555*** 1.559*** 1.560***       
Somewhat:Male  1.261*** 1.268*** 1.277***       
A little/Not at all:35-54  1.025*** 1.021*** 1.026***       
Somewhat:35-54  1.021*** 1.016*** 1.029***       
A little/Not at all:18-34  1.360*** 1.353*** 1.353***       
Somewhat:18-34  1.142*** 1.133*** 1.118***       
A little/Not at all:Level1/None  1.643*** 1.629*** 1.009         
Somewhat:Level1/None  1.070*** 1.071*** 0.250         
A little/Not at all:Alevel/GCSE/Olevel  1.080*** 1.025*** 0.970         
Somewhat:Alevel/GCSE/Olevel  0.924*** 0.860*** 0.702         
A little/Not at all:Illness/disability  0.770*** 0.777*** 0.768***       
Somewhat:Illness/disability  0.810*** 0.818*** 0.807***       
A little/Not at all:Science Training  1.131*** 3.218*** 1.142***       
Somewhat:Science Training  1.129*** 5.129*** 1.164***     
A little/Not at all:Efficacy X Science Training   0.918***  
Somewhat:Efficacy X Science Training   0.884***  
A little/Not at all:Efficacy X Level1/None    1.041       
Somewhat:Efficacy X Level1/None    1.136       
A little/Not at all:Efficacy X Alevel/GCSE/Olevel    1.007      
Somewhat:Efficacy X Alevel/GCSE/Olevel    1.017      
LR Test                                        173.165*** (df 
(df= 6) 
            198.877*** 
             (df = 20)  
        208.145***  
       (df = 22) 
      205.097***  
      (df = 24) 
               N=1465;  Note:*p<0.1; **p<0.05; ***p<0.01                                                     
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Table 4.3 Mixed logit- trust models 
 
                                                                        Dependent variable: 
 
 















(4)     
 
A little/Not at all:Intercept 0.600*** 0.281 0.252 0.386         
Somewhat:Intercept 0.358 0.274 0.234 0.389         
A little/Not at all:Trust.L 1.076*** 1.335*** 1.656*** 0.546         
Somewhat:Trust.L 2.083*** 2.229*** 2.646*** 0.799         
A little/Not at all:Trust.Q 1.783*** 1.385*** 0.979*** 5.435***       
Somewhat:Trust.Q 0.946** 0.864** 0.445 2.547***       
A little/Not at all:Trust.C 0.941*** 0.862*** 0.850*** 0.465         
Somewhat:Trust.C 0.934*** 0.912*** 0.962** 0.533         
A little/Not at all:Trust^4 0.955*** 0.949*** 0.903*** 0.982**        
Somewhat:Trust4 1.061*** 1.068*** 0.952*** 1.216***       
A little/Not at all:Male  1.288*** 1.305*** 1.301***       
Somewhat:Male  1.139*** 1.160*** 1.162***       
A little/Not at all:35-54  1.089*** 1.087*** 1.093***       
Somewhat:35-54  1.063*** 1.062*** 1.058***       
A little/Not at all:18-34  1.817*** 1.820*** 1.801***       
Somewhat:18-34  1.325*** 1.318*** 1.321***       
A little/Not at all:Level1/None  3.348*** 3.400*** 2.391***       
Somewhat:level1/None  1.581*** 1.641*** 0.999**        
A little/Not at all:Alevel/GCSE/Olevel  1.568*** 1.554*** 0.948**        
Somewhat:Alevel.GCSE.Olevel  1.131*** 1.121*** 0.795*        
A little/Not at all:Illness/Disability  0.829*** 0.822*** 0.843***       
Somewhat:Illness/Disability  0.843*** 0.833*** 0.845***     
A little/Not at all:Science Training  0.844*** 1.087*** 0.848***       
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Somewhat:Science Training  0.969*** 1.312*** 0.973***       
A little/Not at all:Trust.L X Science Training   0.584  
Somewhat:Trust.L X Science Training   0.660  
A little/Not at all:Trust.Q X Science Training   2.117  
Somewhat:Trust.Q X Science Training   3.621  
A little/Not at all:Trust.C X Science Training   0.960  
Somewhat:Trust.C X Science Training   0.824  
A little/Not at all:Trust^4 X Science Training   1.109  
Somewhat:Trust^4 X Science Training   1.252  
A little/Not at all:Trust.L X Level1/None    2.172**        
Somewhat:Trust.L X Level1/None    3.255***       
A little/Not at all:Trust.Q X Level1/None    0.186         
Somewhat:Trust.Q X Level1/None    0.201         
A little/Not at all:Trust.C X Level1/None    1.659**        
Somewhat:Trust.C X Level1/None    1.474*        
A little/Not at all:Trust^4 X Level1/None    1.053**        
Somewhat:Trust^4 X Level1/None    0.698         
A little/Not at all:Trust.L X Alevel/GCSE/Olevel    4.640***       
Somewhat:Trust.L X Alevel/GCSE/Olevel    3.127**        
A little/Not at all:Trust.Q X Alevel/GCSE/Olevel    0.137         
Somewhat:Trust.Q X Alevel/GCSE/Olevel    0.345         
A little/Not at all:Trust.C X Alevel/GCSE/Olevel    2.917***       
Somewhat:Trust.C X Alevel/GCSE/Olevel    2.158**        
A little/Not at all:Trust^4 X Alevel/GCSE/Olevel    0.920*        
Somewhat:Trust^4 X Alevel/GCSE/Olevel    1.093**        
LR Test                                            20.430*     93.602***      102.438***    110.358*** 
         (df = 12)    (df = 26)     (df = 34)    (df = 42) 
N=1465; Note:*p<0.1; **p<0.05; ***p<0.01                                                     
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5. Overall Conclusion 
 
In this PhD thesis, I set out to unearth socio-economic inequalities in constructs central to 
Public Understanding of Science in order to shed light on what might aid us theorise and 
practice a more democratic form of science and medicine. In Chapter 2: I investigated age-
related bias in science knowledge; I tried to empirically distinguish between lack of 
information and misinformation; following the identification of age-related bias, I conducted 
a sensitivity analysis to check whether using the traditional summed score approach to 
modelling science knowledge, instead of accounting for measurement non-invariance with 
relation to age, would lead to substantively different conclusions about genetic research. In 
Chapter 3 I introduced a new construct, biomedical self-efficacy, and I examined: 
knowledge and efficacy gaps between low and high educational groups; I also examined the 
role of Internet use and paying attention to medical stories online in reducing those gaps. In 
Chapter 4 I examined how biomedical efficacy and trust, along with a range of other socio-
demographics, affect whether individuals want a say in the decisions regarding their health. 
There are three major conclusions derived from Chapter 2. First, that ‘don’t know’ answers 
seem to stand on their own, and could potentially offer a more substantively interesting 
representation of individuals in terms of their knowledge, or lack thereof, if that is of 
interest. Moreover, misinformation did not emerge as a separate dimension using this data. 
Perhaps with another dataset that proposition would hold water. Second, there is very 
significant measurement non-invariance in relation to age. This effectively means that we 
may not be able to correctly compare people of different ages in terms of their observed level 
of knowledge, or lack thereof. That would not take into account the measurement error and 
heterogeneity of this construct and measurement instrument, and potentially lead to us 
making erroneous conclusions about what people of different ages know about science. A 
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separate analysis investigating attitudes to genetics was carried out using two different 
parameterisations: 1) the latent class framework taking into account that people who say they 
‘don’t know’ form a separate group, as well as the measurement non-invariance in relation to 
age identified in previous analyses; 2) the summed score approach using both a continuous 
measure as well as a broken down version of it, that is meant to render it comparable to the 
latent classes. Evidence was found that using the traditional summed scale combining ‘don’t 
know’ and incorrect answers, whether as a scale or categorical variable, does not introduce 
bias when examining an attitudinal question such as people’s optimism regarding the 
potential of genetic research. In other words, applied researchers can rest assured that using 
the simplest method will most likely not bias their substantive and theoretical conclusions, 
despite evidence of measurement non-equivalence. This may well be because a misinformed 
group was not found. In this context, and with this data, admitting that one doesn’t know and 
trying to provide an answer (that is incorrect) may not trigger different cognitive processes, 
as misinformation has been found to do. The other possibility is that a misinformed group 
was not identified because an explicit ‘don’t know’ option was offered. And yet another 
potential explanation is that ‘probably true/false’ answers were grouped with ‘definitely 
true/false’ answers because of sample size constraints. Perhaps with different data, a 
misinformed group of British individuals can be identified, if it really exists. 
Chapter 3 has made three important contributions to the Public Understanding of Science 
literature, as well as to a wider literature on socio-economic inequalities. First, a new 
measure, biomedical self-efficacy, was operationalised. Unlike perceived knowledge on its 
own, this new measure offers additional insight by taking into account how people’s self-
reported understanding of key terms in biomedicine works in concordance with their 
willingness to participate in policy relevant public consultation exercises.  The second 
contribution is that we now have better comprehension of educational inequalities in efficacy 
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and science knowledge in a UK context.  The third, and perhaps most important, output is 
the finding that the Internet appears to work as both a divider and an equaliser, which is in 
line with the mixed findings regarding factual and perceived science knowledge. General 
increased use of the Internet seems to be the most important factor in reducing educational 
inequities in science knowledge with a focus on biology and genetics. As far as efficacy is 
concerned, if both those with more education and their counterparts report that they pay 
attention to medical stories online, inequalities in efficacy augment. Nonetheless, disparities 
reduce between those lower on education who report remembering seeing information 
relating to medical research online, and those higher on education that do not report paying 
attention to online medical research stories. In other words, paying attention will only help 
the former catch up provided their complements do not report engaging with online content 
about medical research. The models explain almost a quarter of the variability in efficacy 
and knowledge.  
In the matter of science policy implications, it seems that promoting more biomedical 
material online can only help reduce the democratic deficit to an extent. Encouragingly, 
Internet use does promote a better understanding of science knowledge. With regards to their 
confidence about it, the picture looks slightly different. Using the Internet a lot and paying 
attention to medical research content only helps reduce the discrepancies very slightly if 
those highly education do not report engaging with similar content. Having said that, perhaps 
future studies could employ a better measure of attention and test whether the same holds 
true. Information dissemination campaigns online seem to have the potential to increase 
knowledge, but they will not necessarily dwindle the educational differences in involvement 
in public debates about policy matters. One potential strategy could be making biomedical 
online content more accessible and even more widely circulated, which may reduce the gap 
between low educated group who engage with it and highly educated people who don’t. The 
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danger of that would be that the highly educated group who do engage with it would be even 
further ahead of their counterparts.  Further studies should endeavour to break down online 
activities and examine which types bode better for increasing knowledge and efficacy in the 
UK. Finally, as explained in the literature review, preferred participation and actual 
participation do not match, unfortunately. Hence, we cannot draw any particular conclusions 
about how increased feelings for efficacy might translate into actual participatory behaviour. 
This is for another study to examine. All we can say is that higher efficacy probably helps 
more than hinders in getting citizens to engage more. 
The research carried out in Chapter 4 has made three important contributions. The first 
overall contribution is made to the literature on patient-doctor interactions. Theoretical 
models of patient-physician interaction have been discussed for decades, but our 
understanding of where the British public position themselves has so far been relatively 
poor. Moreover, the scarcity of studies employing representative samples has left a large gap 
that needs to be addressed. This study has helped shed light on how two polar concepts, 
namely biomedical self-efficacy and trust in doctors as information sources, work both 
divergently and in tandem with individuals’ socio-economic characteristics in shaping public 
participation in medical decision-making in a clinical scenario. High efficacy and low trust 
have been found to lead to more self-reported confidence to challenge their GPs in a clinical 
scenario. The second contribution related to findings regarding which model of patient-
medic interaction the British public seems to prefer. We can think of the levels of strength of 
confidence to challenge a GP’s decisions as indicating adherence to the different types of 
patient-physician interaction models. Ergo, little or no confidence to challenge a doctor is 
taken to designate a preference for the paternalistic model. Some confidence is posited to 
signal a preference for the shared-decision making model. A prominent level of confidence 
is assumed to indicate preference for the informed model of medical decision-making 
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Overall, it seems that the British public adhere more to a shared decision-making model. 
This is supported by the fact that most individuals in this sample show moderate confidence 
and willingness to participate by saying it is like or somewhat like them to question a GP in 
a clinical situation. Openness to experience, decreased neuroticism and agreeableness have 
been found to be related to preferences for a more active decision-making style in other 
studies, so we can infer that perhaps these personality traits are quite prevalent in the UK. 
This is encouraging for a democracy, in the sense that people with such personality traits 
may be easier to convince to be involved in other forms of participation in science. The third 
contribution addresses a survey methodological gap in the health literature by employing a 
representative sample of the UK population. Due to the moderate prediction accuracy of the 
model, no strong policy claims can be made. However, in terms of reducing a democratic 
deficit in patient participation in modern medical practice, things look quite bright on this 
front, given that most people seem in favour of a shared decision-making model. Aiming to 
reduce the gap between men and women, with the latter being more likely to have 
confidence in a medical situation, is an avenue that could potentially lead to an even fairer 
medical practice system. Another potential avenue is increasing people’s confidence through 
campaigns that disseminate more attractive, distilled, and widespread information relating to 
at least various common ailments people present themselves to the doctor with. Future 
research should explore other factors that might play a part in public attitudes towards 
participation in medical decision-making to further elucidate this. 
Limitations: The three empirical chapters presented in this thesis have a number of 
limitations, which should be borne in mind when considering the findings. Firstly, the 
response rates to the three Waves of the Wellcome Trust Monitor Survey are quite low, 
namely: 49.3% for the adult sample at Wave I, 52.6% for the adult sample at Wave II, and 
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51.4% for the sample at Wave III ( unlike the first two waves, this was not fielded to a young 
sample).  
High response rates normally signify that the data is more likely to be representative of the 
general population. Survey methodologists generally recommend targets of 70 to 85% 
response rates (Groves et al., 2009). Having said that, Babbie (2004) suggested that a 
response rate of 50% is acceptable, and the survey data should not be discarded. A meta-
analysis has also recently shown that response rates are not necessarily linked to 
nonresponse bias (Groves and Peytcheva, 2008). Meterko et al. (2015) also show that ‘low’ 
response rate surveys may indeed represent attitudes of the general population with 
accuracy. However, there is no way to test whether respondents who chose to decline to take 
part in the Wellcome Monitor Survey differ, in terms of their knowledge, efficacy, and 
attitudes towards participation in medical-decision ( for instance),  from those who did. 
Thus, results from the three empirical chapters should not be interpreted as greatly 
representative of the general UK population. In other words, any findings are chiefly 
relatable to this sample only. Policy implications discussed above should thus also be 
interpreted with caution. However, as Meterko et al. (2015) recommend, these results should 
not be regarded as uninformative. 
 
Secondly, the Wellcome Trust Monitor sample appears to be very well educated. For 
instance, in Chapter 3, 50% of the sample at Wave II possesses a higher degree. This is not 
entirely representative of the population distribution of education in the UK at the time the 
data was collected. When interviews were conducted in 2012, 35.9% of the UK population 
possessed a higher education qualification (ONS, 2012). Given that education-based 
inequalities in knowledge and efficacy are the focus of Chapter 3, the implications are 
important. Such a well-educated sample is likely to possess more knowledge and have a 
higher sense of efficacy overall. This can distort our findings related to how great knowledge 
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and efficacy gaps really are. Put succinctly, the knowledge and efficacy gaps found may be 
larger than those we may have found with a different sample, more similar, in terms of their 
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